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This thesis seeks to examine the interplay between business and human rights within the context of political 
transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule. In the wake of the globalisation process and the subsequent 
breakdown of the Westphalian state system, transnational corporations (TNCs) have acquired augmented 
powers at a global level where previously states had been the only players; and yet TNCs have none of the 
human rights obligations of states, particularly under international law. This dissertation aims to examine why 
this accountability lacuna exists in relation to corporations, specifically in relation to state-sponsored human 
rights violations in which TNCs are complicit. The thesis addresses issues relating to (i) to what extent 
corporate actors are and should be held accountable under international human rights law; and (ii) how they 
could be held accountable. The thesis accordingly makes an examination of the current accountability trends 
and mechanisms available, as well as the history informing corporate accountability for complicity in human 
rights violations. It is argued that issues of corporate accountability for complicity in human rights violations 
are made more complex in the context of political transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule. In this 
vein, the dissertation examines the South African example of such a political transition; namely: (i) what 
accountability mechanisms were employed in order to address issues of corporate complicity in state-
sponsored human rights violations in the South African milieu; (ii) the success thereof; and (iii) the lessons 
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Chapter One: Corporate Accountability as a Problem of Transitional Justice 
1.1 Introduction 
The late twentieth century has heralded the advancement of human rights and the growing reach of 
international human rights law; in the midst of this development, however, new interrelated issues have 
gradually emerged. The fundamental changes of a globalized world have presented new challenges to 
human rights and their enforcement; new players, aside from states and individuals, are directly and 
indirectly involved in human rights violations. Accordingly, new accountability mechanisms able to address 
these new actors and novel concerns need to be developed. In this regard, a key question is whether, or in 
what sense, corporations can be held accountable for human rights violations with which they are directly or 
indirectly involved.  
Corporations, in particular transnational corporations (TNCs), now represent a formidable force in the 
international arena, not only in terms of their economic activities but also in terms of their influence and 
involvement in the internal political affairs of many different societies, including authoritarian regimes and 
military dictatorships. There are numerous ways in which corporations, and in particular transnational 
corporations, may commit or be involved in human rights violations. Corporations may violate human rights 
either by being directly involved in their perpetration, or they may be indirectly involved or “complicit” in such 
violations. However, few accountability mechanisms are available in relation to TNC complicity in human 
rights violations. As corporations expand their operations from local to global contexts the degree of 
accountability for their behaviour, particularly in relation to human rights violations, increasingly begs 
examination. In the course of this thesis the various accountability mechanisms for corporate complicity in 
human rights violations, particularly those available in terms of public international law, will be examined in 
order to determine whether the current mechanisms are stringent enough, and whether international human 
rights law offers adequate methods for curtailing the augmented power of corporations. Beginning with an 
examination of the history of corporate accountability, particularly within public international law, the thesis 
aims to establish (i) why there is in fact this lacuna in international law in terms of corporate accountability for 
human rights violations; (ii) what mechanisms may be used to hold corporations accountable; and (iii) the 
prospects of success of such accountability mechanisms. 
As international human rights law is a relatively new and still evolving field this thesis may perhaps offer 
more questions than answers. Nevertheless the topic warrants exploration: as territorial borders become less 
defined and corporations entrench themselves as powerful global players, questions regarding their 
accountability for human rights violations multiply. There is a growing need to assess TNC accountability for 
human rights violations in comparison to that of traditional international human rights actors, namely 













It is clear, even upon a superficial viewing of the landscape, that human rights discourse has achieved 
increasing prominence globally and has coalesced in broad political and legal changes.1 Within this milieu, 
international human rights law has come to prominence as a mechanism for enforcing human rights. Human 
rights discourse has achieved a global reach far beyond the initial theories that shaped general rights 
discourse, such as those of Hobbes, Locke, Kant and Hohfeld2 and international human rights law has 
spearheaded the legal codification of human rights norms. Accordingly, the focus of this work will be primarily 
on the significance of international human rights law in relation to the accountability of corporations for their 
complicity in state-sponsored human rights violations. In particular, this thesis will place a specific focus on 
the business-human rights interplay within the context of political transitions from authoritarian rule, and will 
examine the accountability of TNCs for complicity in human rights violations committed by the states in which 
they are operating. 
The aim of this work is thus, by way of descriptive and illustrative analysis, to examine and analyse the 
manner in which corporations, particularly TNCs, have been held legally accountable for human rights 
violations in which they were directly or indirectly involved. The examination will be limited to contexts of 
political transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes; in this sense it involves an investigation of 
transitional justice. South Africa, and its recent political transition and transitional justice processes, will serve 
as an illustrative example of the manner in which corporations have been dealt with where they have been 
complicit or indirectly involved with state-sponsored human rights abuses.  
1.2 Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Violations 
As a point of departure, it is important to establish what may be understood by the term “complicity”. This is 
not an easy terms to define, as it encompasses a number of separate notions. In a pure legal sense, 
however, the “offences of complicity” may encompass a myriad of offences; inter alia aiding, abetting, acting 
as an accessory or accessory after the fact, conspiring, or assisting.3 Ultimately, in a legal sense, there is no 
uniform standard with regard to what complicity is, but the key elements are the same; namely that there is 
intentional encouragement or assistance, on the part of B (the complicit actor), in assisting A (the 
perpetrator) in the commission of an offence by A.4 A number of international law instruments, such as the 
                                                     
1 Todd Landman, Protecting Human Rights: A Comparative Study. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005; Thomas 
Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999; Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of 
Communism, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001; Kiyoteru Tsutsui, “Global Civil Society and Ethnic Social Movements in 
the Contemporary World,” Sociological Forum 19, 2004, p.63-88. 
2 See Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays. (translated by Ted Humphrey). Hackett Publishing Company (1983); John 
Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Peter Laslett ed., 1988); Thomas Hobbes, Of Man, Being the First Part of Leviathan. Vol. XXXIV, 
Part 5. The Harvard Classics. New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1909–14; Bartleby (2001); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, Yale University Press (1946). The article appeared earlier at 26 Yale Law Journal 710 
(1917).  
3 Paul Watchman, “Complicity: Charting a Path through the Conceptual Minefield”, in the 2005 Business & Human Rights Seminar 
Report: Exploring Responsibilities and Complicity (London: December 2005). 













United Nations Global Compact;5 (Global Compact), also attempt to give a definition or guideline in terms of 
when companies would be considered to be guilty of complicity in terms of Principle 2 of the Global 
Compact, complicity is comprised of two elements: (i) “[a]n act or omission (failure to act) by a company, or 
individual representing a company, that „helps‟ (facilitates, legitimizes, assists, encourages, etc.) another, in 
some way, to carry out a human rights abuse”; and (ii) [t]he knowledge by the company that its act or 
omission could provide such help”.
6 The UN High Commission for Human Rights states that where a 
company “authorises, tolerates or knowingly ignores human rights abuses committed by an entity associated 
with it, or if the company knowingly provides practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial 
effect on the perpetration of human rights abuses”
7 then it would be deemed to have been complicit.  
The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) has suggested an approach to corporate accountability for 
complicity in human rights violations against which corporations can monitor their behaviour, detailed in a 
three volume series.8 In volume 1 of the series, the ICJ addresses notions of corporate complicity and 
accountability.  
The ICJ report aims to provide solutions beyond the ambit of international human rights law as a mechanism 
for accountability for corporate complicity in human rights violations, and focuses primarily on criminal law 
(international criminal law, “supplemented by criminal law concepts common to national systems”; and “the 
law of civil remedies found in both common law countries and civil law jurisdictions”).
9 The ICJ Report 
accordingly only considers the circumstances under which a corporation could be held legally accountable 
for complicit conduct under criminal law.10  
The ICJ adopts a three-prong approach to the circumstances under which a company could be held 
criminally accountable for complicity in gross human rights abuses,11 by using the principles of (i) causation; 
(ii) knowledge; and (iii) proximity: 
(i) causation: whether the company‟s conduct (a) enabled, (b) exacerbated, or (c) facilitated the 
commission of gross human rights abuses; 
                                                     
5 Retrieved at www.unglobalcompact.org/AbouttheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html on 12 December 2010. 
6 Principle 2 of the Global Compact retrieved from http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/Principle2.html, on 
12 January 2011. 
7 See OHCHR Briefing Paper, “The Global Compact and Human Rights: Understanding Sphere of Influence and Complicity, in UN 
Global Compact / Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR)”, Embedding Human Rights in 
Business Practice (New York: November 2004). 
8 International Commission of Jurists, Corporate Complicity & Legal Accountability: Report of the International Commission of Jurists 
Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in International Crimes, International Commission of Jurists 2008. 
9 Ibid, p.5. 
10 Ibid, p.7. 
11 “[G]ross human rights abuses” in the ICJ Report, is “generally understood as describing an infringement of a flagrant nature that 
amounts to a direct and outright assault on internationally recognised human rights…for example, crimes against humanity, enforces 












(ii) knowledge: whether the company (a) knows, or (b) should have foreseeably known, “that its 
conduct would be likely to contribute to the gross human rights abuses”; 
(iii) proximity: whether the company was close or proximate “(geographically, or in terms of the 
duration, frequency and/or intensity of interactions or relationship)” to (a) the primary agent of 
the human rights abuses, or (b) to the victims.12 
Significantly, the test requires no intention or even awareness related to the human rights abuse on the part 
of the company, in order for it to be held accountable; a reasonableness standard is employed – if a 
„reasonable‟ person would have foreseen the consequences of their conduct, then the company will be 
legally accountable. Moreover, the company‟s proximal relation to the perpetrator or victim of the abuse 
determines the extent of its liability; the closer proximity the more likely that the company will be held 
accountable.13 The ICJ report represents a pragmatic approach towards notions of accountability and 
complicity in relation to corporations. But it has no legal standing: as the ICJ itself observes, the test outlined 
in its report is merely a guide for both businesses and prosecutors, lawyers and victims as to when 
businesses are most likely to be (and should be) held legally accountable for complicity in gross human 
rights abuses.14 
Therefore at this juncture, although the parameters of the term complicity are not clearly defined in general, 
and in relation to corporations in particular, however  there a number of key elements of complicity; namely 
(i) knowledge or foreseeability of the human rights violation occurring); (ii) intention (to assist the perpetrator) 
in the commission of the human rights violation; and (iii) the corporation does not directly commit the human 
rights violation However, in practice it appears difficult to determine (i) the degree of complicity, and (ii) what 
measure of accountability or culpability should be attributed to the complicit party.   
1.3  Accountability and the Business/Human Rights Paradigm 
The late twentieth century heralded a global human rights awakening in public international law with the 
emergence of more human rights tribunals and permanent and special courts than ever before. These 
include: the International Criminal Court (ICC) which was established on 1 July 2002 under the auspices of 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) adopted on 17 July 1998;15 the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (established in 2002, under the auspices of UN Security Council Resolution 131516 
adopted unanimously on 14 August 2000),17 the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ( ICTY) 
                                                     
12 Ibid, p.8. 
13 Ibid,  p.8. 
14 Ibid, p.7. 
15 See the “United Nations Treaty Collection” at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-
10&chapter=18&lang=en (retrieved 02 January 2011). 
16 S/RES/1315. 












(established on 25 May 1993 in terms of UN Security Council Resolution 82718 adopted unanimously on 25 
May 1993);19 and the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) (established in November 1994 under the 
auspices of UN Security Council Resolution 95520 adopted on 8 November 1994);21 all established for the 
prosecution of individuals alleged to have perpetrated human rights violations, primarily war crimes; crimes 
against humanity; and/or genocide.  Furthermore, beyond the development of such institutions, there has 
been a considerable international groundswell and enthusiasm to assert the need for holding perpetrators of 
human rights violations, individuals as well as state agents, accountable.  
Individuals and states, as perpetrators of human rights violations, have been the main concern of this quest 
for accountability; corporations, however, have not received similar attention. Human rights discourse 
appears to be characterised by an implicit differentiation between natural persons and states, on the one 
hand, and juristic entities such as corporations, on the other hand. The quest for holding perpetrators of 
human rights violations accountable has primarily concerned the former while ignoring the latter. However, in 
practice it is far from clear how corporations in general, and TNCs in particular, may actually be held 
accountable for their complicity in human rights violations. TNCs cannot readily be held accountable by host 
states within their domestic criminal and civil law jurisdictions in part due to the distinctive structure of TNCs. 
A TNC is typically not one company, but rather a central company with separate nodes (subsidiary 
companies) in different jurisdictions. These subsidiaries are in turn incorporated in different countries, but 
usually receive their main directives from the parent comp ny. Vernon describes a TNC as: “a parent 
company that controls a large cluster of corporations of various nationalities… [with] access to a common 
pool of human and financial resources and responsive to the elements of a common strategy.”
22 
Of course, de jure differentiation of this kind may well be compatible with a considerable degree of 
coordination in practice; however, it is hard to determine how much de facto authority a parent company 
actually exercises over its subsidiaries. Where it appears that the parent company exercises extensive 
control of its subsidiaries, the justification of said parent being held accountable for activities by its 
subsidiaries may increase: “[o]bligations that extend to the world wide activities of the firm can be placed on 




                                                     
18 S/RES/827.  
19 See http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/306/28/IMG/N9330628.pdf?OpenElement (retrieved 02 January 2011). 
20 S/RES/955. 
21 See http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/605/32/PDF/N0060532.pdf?OpenElement (retrieved 2 January 2011). 
22 Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises, New York: Basic Books, 1971, p.4 













Therefore, as we enter the early twenty-first century a significant lacuna can be identified in the development 
of international law: how to deal with corporate actors in holding them accountable for their complicity in past 
human rights violations. Some attempts have been made to develop at least a general framework for this 
purpose,24 but so far the adoption of these measures has been on a voluntary basis only. In so far as these 
measures are voluntary they involve self-regulation by corporations; thus in practice corporations themselves 
determine their degree of accountability for their complicity in human rights violations, without any objective 
standard or monitoring body to guide them or reprimand them for non-compliance. Moreover, these 
measures are yet to capture and focus the attention of the majority of corporations on their accountability for 
human rights violations. 
This thesis will explore and examine the extent to which corporations can currently be held accountable with 
regard to human rights violations in which they were complicit. However, due to length constraints, it will not 
seek to address in detail the further question of how to hold the corporation accountable. This thesis seeks 
primarily to offer a descriptive analysis of the history of corporate accountability and the current standards 
and trends in terms of accountability.  
At a general level these issues concern the underlying relation between morality, law and business. 
Historically, the purpose and sole responsibility of business has been perceived, certainly in capitalist 
societies, as being the maximization of profit in the free market. A corporation is primarily mandated to make 
profit and does not have any obligations apart from pursuing the interests of its shareholders, or to engage in 
enterprises which are not lucrative. Corporations (unlike non-governmental organizations and other civil 
society collectives) are not expected to be altruistic in their pursuits. As Milton Friedman notably observed: 
“[t]here is one and only one social responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage in activities designed to 
increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition, 
without deception or fraud.”
25  
On this free market perspective, companies are there to make a profit and human rights are a subsidiary 
issue. Until recently scant attention appears to have been paid to the interplay between corporate enterprise 
and human rights. The issue of accountability for corporations, in particular TNCs, is neither a solely political 
or legal question, and in fact it is also an economic question; as TNCs, in their mandates and operations, 
straddle geopolitical, economic and legal lines.  These lines are further blurred by the transformative nature 
of geopolitical systems in general. In terms of international law we are moving, it has been argued, from the 
                                                     
24 For example, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Revision 200, Vol. 2006. Paris (2000) retrieved at 
http://www.oecd.org; the United Nations “Global Compact” retrieved from http://www.unglobalcompact.org; “Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises” 
(U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/13/, 22 April 2009) retrieved at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/11session/A.HRC.11.13.pdf;  
United Nations Social and Economic Council, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2. New York: United Nations. 
25 Milton Friedman “The Social Responsibility of a Business is to increase Profits” New York Times (Magazine) 13 September 1970 at 












“Westphalian order” of territorially defined sovereign nation states
26 to a globalized “[p]ost-individuals” world 
where geographical borders or territorial jurisdictions are becoming more fluid.27 Corporations have 
increasing global reach and power, to some degree surpassing that of states which have a weakened ability 
to determine and regulate the movement of goods and services transnationally.28 As a result transnational 
corporations are taking on powers and roles previously assigned to the state and becoming at once more 
politicised and less accountable. In light of such changes, public international law as well as domestic law 
may have to be amended to reflect that individuals and states are no longer the only or primary actors in 
both domestic and international arenas. This has significant implications for the accountability of TNCs for 
their involvement in human rights violations. As Peter Muchlinski concludes:  
“[the] traditional notion that only states
 
and state agents can be held responsible for human rights 
violations is being challenged as the economic and social power of [TNCs] appears to rise in the 
wake of the increasing integration of the global economy.”
29  
It is nevertheless common cause that corporations cannot be castigated for their mere presence in an 
authoritarian society or in conflict situations; mere presence does not necessarily amount to active collusion 
or complicity with human rights violations. That being said, and while accepting that the presence of TNCs in 
authoritarian regimes and conflict zones is driven by self-interest and profiteering, they can and should be 
held to account for involvement in any human rights wrongs committed in pursuit of that interest (even if not 
committed by them directly). Although the links are tenuous, they may nonetheless be tangible. Even if 
corporations might not have political profiles, this does not preclude their possible complicity in human rights 
violations. However, due in part to the cardinal position enjoyed by TNCs there has been a reluctance to deal 
with them as perpetrators of human rights violations, the more so in the murky contexts of political 
transitions. 
1.3 Accountability in the Context of Transitions (from Authoritarian Rule)  
Issues of corporate accountability for complicity in state-sponsored human rights violations are further 
complicated in contexts of political transitions from authoritarian rule; and such issues of accountability for 
past human rights abuses, in the context of authoritarian regimes, typically arise in the context of incipient 
change to democratic rule. A democratic transition involves a dynamic process with competing interests and 
conflicting moral and political considerations. Emergent democratic conventions and structures, including the 
                                                     
26 See R.R. Palmer, J. Colton, and L. Kramer, A History of the Modern World, 9th ed, New York: Knopf (2002), p.139. 
27 S.J. Kobrin, “Private Political Authority and Public Responsibility: Transnational Politics, Transnational Firms, and Human Rights,” 
Business Ethics Quarterly 19, 2009, p.349-374; A.G. Scherer, G. Palazzo, and D. Matten, “Introduction to the Special Issue: 
Globalization as a Challenge for Business Responsibilities,” Business Ethics Quarterly 19, 2009, p.327-348. 
28 A. Giddens, Consequences of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press 1990; D.A. Irwin, Free Trade under Fire, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, (2002). 
29 P.T. Muchlinski. 2001. “Human Rights and Multinationals: Is There a Problem?” International Affairs 77(1), p. 31 as cited in S.J. 
Kobrin, “Private Political Authority and Public Responsibility: Transnational Politics, Transnational Firms, and Human Rights,” Business 












executive, legislature and judiciary, and society in general, are in a state of flux. Dealing with issues of 
accountability in a transitional context where basic perspectives on perpetrators and the rights of victims are 
not yet settled either in law or politics is both necessary and a special challenge. As José Zalaquett 
observed, “dealing with transitional political situations is a new area of human rights practice that poses 
some complex ethical, legal and practical questions”.
30 This is the domain of transitional justice. 
There is no concise definition of transitional justice, and multiple definitions abound. The term seems to have 
first appeared in the lexicon in the early nineties (although not necessarily with the same meaning it has 
today).31 At a foundational or basic level, transitional justice is, as stated by Ruti Teitel, one of the seminal 
authors in this emerging field, “the conception of justice in periods of political transition”.32 In the influential 
formulation of Neil Kritz transitional justice is concerned with how emerging democracies „reckon‟ or deal with 
the wrongs of the past, perpetrated by a prior regime.33 This implies that transitional justice does not merely 
focus on the punishment of perpetrators, but also on the healing of victims, as well as aiming at the 
reintegration of a somewhat fractured society as a whole. 
 
Even so, „transitional justice‟ tends to have a narrower focus and more specific sense than the broader set of 
issues at stake in, for example, the German debates on „”reckoning with the past”. Thus Timothy Garton Ash 
has contended that the English terminology fails to capture all the elements of the German 
“Geschichtsaufarbeitung”, and “Vergangenheitsbewältigung”, which “may be translated as „treating‟ the 
past”…“„working over‟ the past, „confronting‟ it, „coping, dealing or coming to terms with‟ it; even „overcoming‟ 
the past. The variety of possible translations indicates the complexity of the matter at hand.‟”
34 Compared to 
this, as Paige Arthur‟s account of its genealogy demonstrates the new sub-field of transitional justice has 
been concerned with such issues as that of accountability for human rights violations in a narrower legal-
institutional perspective in the transitional context : 
 
“Instead of “coming to terms” with historical complexities (as one might expect in an effort to deal 
with “the past”), transitional justice was presented as deeply enmeshed with political problems that 
were legal-institutional and, relatively, short-term in nature. So short-term, in fact, that they could be 
dealt with specifically during a “transitional” period.”
35 
                                                     
30 José Zalaquett, “Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Governments: Principles Applicable and Political 
Constraints”, in State Crimes: Punishment or Pardon (Justice and Society Program of The Aspen Institute ed., 1989), at p.26. 
31 See Paige Arthur, “How „Transitions‟ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice” in Human Rights 
Quarterly, Vol. 31, No.2 2, May 2009, p.332. Ruti Teitel, however, lays claim to having coined the term; Ruti Teitel, “Editorial Note – 
Transitional Justice Globalized”, 2 International Journal of Transitional Justice 1 (2008). 
32 Ruti G. Teitel, „Transitional Justice Genealogy‟, 16 Harvard Human Rights Journal 69 (2003). 
33 Neil Kritz, Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes (1995) as cited in Paige Arthur‟s “How 
„Transitions‟ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice” in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 2, May 
2009, p.331. 
34 Timothy Garton Ash, The Truth About Dictatorship, N.Y. Rev. Books, 19 Feb. 1998, at p. 35, as cited in Paige Arthur‟s “How 
„Transitions‟ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice” in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 2, May 
2009, p.332. 
35 Paige Arthur “How „Transitions‟ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice” in Human Rights Quarterly, 













It is not the aim of this thesis to provide an in-depth analysis of transitional justice in general; rather it aims to 
examine some basic issues relevant to the availability and use of legal-institutional mechanisms of holding 
corporations accountable for human rights violations within the transitional context. 
In this regard a basic challenge is posed by the fact that under former authoritarian regimes pervasive forms 
of human rights abuse (and abuses of power) typically permeated the legal and political spheres as well as 
the executive, legislative and judicial dimensions of government. Accordingly, transitional justice processes 
must attempt to steer a path towards democracy where key institutions, including the judiciary, required to 
serve as vehicles for democratic change, have themselves been tainted with an abusive character. Such 
institutions must themselves be transformed as vehicles for justice and accountability, and yet must also 
remain functional throughout the transformative process.36 In such circumstances there is a pressing need 
for the new democratic regime to make the perpetrators of past human rights violations accountable, while 
also attempting to distance the even-handedness and rule of law required of the new democratic 
dispensation from the arbitrary brutality of the former authoritarian regime. As Elster astutely observed, in a 
transforming society there is tension between “the desire to demarcate oneself from the earlier regime and 
the desire to punish that regime as severely as it deserves.”37  
Transitional justice is not a contemporary phenomenon only (although the focus of this piece will be on 
contemporary transitions); in fact elements of transitional justice are already evident in the democratic 
transitions of ancient Athens.38 War crimes tribunals also have an extensive history going back 200 years 
and more.39 However, contemporary transitional justice had its genesis with the Nuremberg Tribunal 
following World War II, even if the term itself was not yet used in association with the Nuremberg Tribunal.40 
However, the Nuremberg Tribunal established a historical landmark in the development of international law 
and the creation of international law structures to hold perpetrators of international human rights violations 
accountable.41 There have, however, been further, more recent developments in the field of transitional 
justice. 
A significant subsequent development in the broad field of transitional justice involved the use of non-judicial 
accountability processes in Latin America and post-communist Eastern Europe. In the wake of Argentina‟s 
transition to democratic rule from 1984, and Chile‟s later democratic transition from 1990, truth commissions 
were developed as an accountability mechanism in lieu of criminal prosecution of perpetrators of human 
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University press (2000), p.152. 
37 Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective. Cambridge University Press (2004). p.237. 
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rights violations.42 In post-communist Eastern Europe, lustration and the opening of state security archives 
were developed as mechanisms of accountability for past human rights violations, while the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) came to be regarded as a model of extra-judicial transitional 
justice.43 
1.4 Problem Statement and Research Question 
The aim of this mini-dissertation is to give a primarily descriptive account of the manner in which 
corporations, particularly TNCs, are dealt with in the context of political transitions, where former 
authoritarian regimes have committed clear human rights violations with the arguable complicity of said 
corporate actors. The point of departure of the study will be to describe and elucidate the shifting landscape 
(both legal and political) in which corporations operate as well as their changing roles in this landscape. More 
specifically, the aim of this thesis is to analyze what mechanisms are currently in place to hold corporations 
accountable for human rights violations committed by state agents with whom they were complicit. The focal 
point will be on the accountability of TNCs for their indirect involvement and/or complicity in human rights 
violations by past authoritarian regimes. This will be contextualized with regard to democratic transitions from 
authoritarian rule. The aim is to explore the issue of corporate accountability for indirect involvement in 
human rights violations through a historical account of relevant past developments and an examination of 
current trends and options.  
The evolving role of TNCs in the international milieu requires appropriate means of dealing with any 
malfeasant behaviour by corporations in relation to human rights. Accordingly, this study and investigation is 
motivated by a desire to examine the past structures and current trends in terms of standards of 
accountability for corporations, and the poss ble shortcomings of existing mechanisms, within the context of 
political transitions. The thesis will be primarily descriptive in nature, including a more detailed examination of 
the South African political transition of the mid-nineties.  
The proposed investigation therefore seeks to understand why there has been such limited accountability of 
TNCs for their complicity in human rights abuses. This will require both some historical background and an 
account of the legal-institutional context. The preliminary chapters will thus serve primarily as background, 
laying the foundation for further investigation into the present position. 
An ancillary issue is the normative question whether corporations should be held accountable for 
involvement in, or complicity with, human rights violations by authoritarian regimes, particularly in terms of 
public international law. Ultimately, the answers I will aim to tease out in the course of this literature-based 
                                                     
42 See Jaime Malamud-Goti, Transitional Governments in the Breach: Why Punish State Criminals?, 12 Human Rights Quarterly 1 
(1990); José Zalaquett, “Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past 
Human Rights Violations”, 43 Hastings Law Journal 1425 (1992). 
43  José Zalaquett, „Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past Human 













investigation; are (i) whether corporations should be held accountable for their complicity in human rights 
violations; if so (ii) how such accountability may be enforced against them, particularly in the context of 
political transition.  
The scope of this work will be limited to the transitional context; particularly the lessons that can be learnt 
from the South African experience, in relation to the degree of accountability of TNCs for state-sponsored 
human rights violations. Hence the focus of this work is on the South African case. South Africa is an 
example of a country which, during its transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, notably attempted to 
grapple with issues of individual accountability for human rights violations committed by individuals as well 
as by state agents. But conversely the South African TRC process appears to have neglected the issue of 
corporate accountability in that the post-transition regime only dealt with corporate involvement in the 
perpetration of human rights abuses in passing; and rather focused primarily on individual perpetrators, as 
opposed to organizations or juristic persons. South Africa therefore represents a telling example of the 
inadequacies that abound in relation to dealing with corporations regarding state-sponsored violations of 
human rights. 
Issues of accountability do, however, canvas issues of corporate social responsibility. Accordingly, a 
subsidiary topic will also be the related issue of corporate social responsibility in view of current  debates not 
only about corporate accountability for human rights violations, but also corporate responsibility for taking 
proactive, positive human rights action: “[t]he dispute is not then about how companies should behave, but 
about the best means of securing socially desired behaviour.”44 Therefore the aim is not and should not be to 
police all the activities of corporations, but rather to ground their conduct in a philosophy of social 
responsibility, framed within a global human rights culture. Accordingly, we need to move beyond Friedman‟s 
conception of the “social responsibility of business”
45 being profit-making, as this responsibility also 
encompasses human rights obligations. 
1.5 International human rights law and its Instruments 
Human rights law in the context of domestic criminal law has its theoretical foundations in liberal theory in 
terms of which individual rights serve to protect individuals and prevent the tyranny of the state.46 
International law, for its part, traditionally dealt primarily with relations between states. Therefore while the 
state is the main subject of international law in ensuring the enforcement and protection of human rights, it is 
also, conversely, the primary object of human rights law.47  
                                                     
44 See John Parkinson, „The Socially Responsible Company‟ in Michael K. Addo, Human Rights Standards and the Responsibility of 
Transnational Corporations, Springer (1999), p.56. 
45 Milton Friedman Capitalism & Freedom (1962) 133; see also Milton Friedman “The Social Responsibility of a Business is to increase 
Profits” New York Times (Magazine) 13 September 1970 at 32; see also Milton Friedman (ed.), Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press (1962). 
46 See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Peter Laslett ed.), Cambridge University Press (1988).  












Although it has these early foundational roots, current international human rights law first developed in the 
aftermath of World War II (WWII). The United Nations (UN) was founded in 1945, with fifty-one member 
states (consisting primarily of Western states), in the wake of WWII.48 The Charter of the United Nations (UN 
Charter), which included a strong commitment to human rights, came into force on 24 October 1945.49 The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights50 (UDHR), one of the founding human rights instruments, was 
adopted on 10 December 1948, and is considered one of the most important and fundamental human rights 
instruments.51 The International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights,52  the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights53 and its two Optional Protocols54 were later enacted as binding 
treaties giving legal effect to the rights enshrined in the UDHR as well as promoting the principles enshrined 
in the UN Charter. The rights delineated in the UN Charter were later codified, along with the subsequent 
main international human rights conventions, in the International Bill of Rights.55 Nevertheless, as Henry 
Steiner and Philip Alston observed, the UDHR is: 
“the parent document, the initial burst of idealism and enthusiasm, terser, more general and grander 
than the treaties, in some sense the constitution of the entire movement…the single most invoked 
human rights instrument.”
56 
Consequently, although the UDHR is declaratory in nature, and therefore does not constitute binding 
international law, it is nevertheless considered to have become part of customary international law.57 And the 
UDHR expressly stipulates that “every individual and every organ of society” has a duty to promote human 
                                                     
48 One of the purposes of the UN includes, "to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, 
cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all 
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49 Chapter XIV of the UN Charter also confirms the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (established in terms of the Statute of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice 16 December 1920) over all UN member states. Therefore any judicial action instituted 
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50 Resolution 217 (III) of the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948. 
51 Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, International human rights in context: Law, politics, and morals. Text and materials (2nd ed.). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press (2000). 
52 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966 (entered into force, 3 
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54 UN General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, United 
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Abolition of the Death Penalty, 15 December 1989, A/RES/44/128, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a70.html (retrieved on 13 January 2011). 
55 The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted in 1948); the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); the Optional 
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rights.58 Therefore it would appear that every person (be they natural or juristic) has an obligation to ensure 
the “promotion” of human rights, and correspondingly, it may be inferred that they also have a duty not to 
infringe upon those rights. 
1.6 Transnational Corporations and Globalisation 
A key factor impacting on the treatment of TNCs, also from a human rights perspective, is that of the 
globalisation process. It is no easier to define “globalisation” than it is to define a transnational corporation, 
and the definitions are many and varied. At a basic level “globalisation” relates to the increasing global 
interconnectedness of people beyond territorial borders or; as Stiglitz observed, globalisation is the ongoing 
process of “closer integration of persons and countries”.
59 Significantly globalisation has led to the diminution 
of the power of the state particularly in trans-border transactions and in relation to TNCs. It has not however 
heralded the complete demise of the state.60 Rather, the globalisation process has aided in the creation of a 
complex global network of separate, yet interconnected nodes, thereby augmenting trans-border trade and 
enterprise. Michael Santoro argued that the power of the modern TNC is the cause and effect of 
globalisation and a result of the “weakened condition of the nation-state system”.61 
This increasing power of TNCs requires us to address what duties, liabilities and responsibilities they may 
have corresponding with their newfound status and power. In recent years there have been some 
experiments in developing a legal basis for transnational corporate accountability.62 Previously, there had 
been a limited range of available judicial measures in the context of domestic criminal justice systems, 
mostly geared towards exacting punishment on individuals, to deal with the misconduct of corporations. A 
chief factor in the growth of new forms of litigation was the introduction of other punitive measures, for 
example fines or punitive taxation, making it possible for corporations to be held accountable or punished for 
their misdeeds. International exchanges between people and bodies need to be more closely monitored and 
require appropriate accountability mechanisms to be put in place.  
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1.7 International Monitoring of Corporate Governance: the South African Case  
Significantly, South Africa is one jurisdiction where the use of corporate governance monitoring is not 
unprecedented. In fact the first model for international monitoring of corporate governance, the Sullivan 
Principles, was implemented in South Africa during Apartheid from 1977 to 1994. The Sullivan Principles are 
considered to represent “the first and most elaborate example we have of transnational, nongovernmental 
corporate monitoring”.
63 In the event the Sullivan Principles proved less than effective at monitoring 
corporate behaviour and fostering corporate practice in tune with global human rights norms.64 Nevertheless 
they pioneered a novel, recognised system of trans-border independent monitoring of parent companies and 
their subsidiary operations, and ultimately of multinationals in general.  
In addition, in South Africa, the Bill of Rights of the new 1996 Constitution65 (Bill of Rights) entrenched a 
number of basic human rights applicable to both natural and juristic persons alike.66 Moreover, the Bill of 
Rights is applicable to all South African law, and is binding upon all organs of state.67 Accordingly, under 
South African law, both natural and juristic persons are now accountable for violations of human rights, as 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights – “the horizontal application of human rights”.68 Therefore South Africa is a 
constitutional democracy where all laws must adhere to and be in line with the tenets enshrined in the 
Constitution. 
1.8 Democratic Transition and Corporate Accountability: The South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission 
In the wake of South Africa‟s political transition, which began in earnest in 1990 and culminated in the first 
democratic elections held in 1994, the negotiated settlement included a provision for amnesty though not a 
blanket amnesty excluding all accountability for perpetrators of gross human rights violations. This resulted 
in the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). In November 1995 Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu was appointed to chair the Commission, with Alex Boraine serving as deputy. The first official 
TRC hearing was held in East London, on 15 April 1996 and the final public hearing was concluded in 
August of 1997 while the Commission submitted its Interim Report in October 1998. 
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The TRC, as part of a negotiated amnesty agreement between the National Party government and the 
liberation movements, was mandated to deal with the perpetrators of politically motivated human rights 
abuses under the prior apartheid regime and during the political conflicts of the anti-apartheid struggle. The 
TRC was established as a vehicle for national unity; with an emphasis on truth telling, restorative justice and 
conditional amnesty in lieu of criminal sanctions or punitive justice.69 The TRC was presented and perceived 
as a model of restorative justice (a term coined during its proceedings), rather than retributive justice, and 
the TRC aimed for societal healing and reconciliation through truth-telling for victims and perpetrators alike. 
The TRC Amnesty Committee granted amnesty to former perpetrators of politically motivated human rights 
violations conditional on full disclosure, without any further punitive sanctions.70  
The TRC has been heavily criticised, however, for not effectively addressing the structural violence and 
systemically abusive character of the apartheid regime. One argument is that too much attention was 
focused upon individual victims of gross human rights violations and perpetrators, rather than the systemic 
nature of the apartheid machine itself, which encroached on the daily lives of all citizens.71  However, the 
involvement of the (international and domestic) business sector in the human rights violations perpetrated by 
the apartheid regime was not entirely overlooked by the TRC. The TRC had a special sectoral hearing 
dealing with the role of the business sector under Apartheid.72 In this forum companies could admit to active 
participation, or indirect contribution, to any human rights atrocities committed by the Apartheid regime, from 
which they had benefited. But few companies were willing to cknowledge any misdemeanour on their part. 
This is an issue which will be examined further in chapter four of this paper.  
1.9 Research design and thesis structure  
The thesis has been designed as a literature-based review of the various accounts and critiques regarding 
the manner in which transnational corporations have been dealt with in terms of their accountability for 
complicity in the commission of human rights violations by authoritarian regimes. I have focused most keenly 
on a number of topical journal articles, which detail the current trends, as well as other texts detailing 
background historical developments. 
In light of the fact that this research question entails both political and legal dimensions, my approach will be 
multidisciplinary and make use of a broad range of literature including economic, political, and legal studies 
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which address the interplay between business and human rights. In order to get a holistic view of the arena, I 
will canvas works from both sides of the spectrum – i.e. those authors who are in favour of creating more 
accountability for corporations as well as those who are not. 
The first step will be to address the underpinnings of political and legal ideology in relation to corporations 
and the extent to which they may be held accountable as human rights actors. As these issues relate directly 
to public international law, it will be important to investigate the manner in which international law at present 
deals with corporate actors and their human rights accountability.  
Whilst the business-human rights interplay encompasses a broad range of issues, this thesis will only focus 
on a specific aspect of that relationship. The scope of this study will be limited primarily to TNCs and their 
relationship with human rights abusive states, and what the standards of accountability, historically and 
currently, are for TNC complicity in such abuses. 
This work will serve as a descriptive analysis of the history of, and the mechanisms currently in place for, 
holding TNCs accountable for state-sponsored human rights violations in which they were complicit. The 
context of this analysis will be within the ambit of political transitions from authoritarian to democratic 
regimes, with a particular focus on the South African case. This work does not attempt to develop a novel 
approach to holding TNCs accountable for complicity in relation to human rights violations committed by 
states, but rather seeks to examine the framework within which TNCs operate and the current, available 
accountability mechanisms. Therefore, although it makes use of a number of perspectives in the literature, it 
does not seek to develop a new accountability mechanism or theory. 
The study consists of five chapters, focused on a distinct but linked set of issues: 
Chapter one: Analytical Framework – The first Chapter sets out the analytical framework of the research 
question and presents the problem as well as the purpose of the study, methodology, as well as a literature 
review. Chapter one serves as an exposition of the background and history pertaining to the aforementioned 
question. This chapter also introduces the concepts and terms which are to be developed in the following 
chapters, as well as introducing, at a general level, the issues to be discussed, in more detail, in each 
chapter.  
Chapter two: Conceptualizing the Business-Human Rights Paradigm – The second chapter will entail a 
conceptual outline of the framework within which corporations operate, and the ideological underpinnings 
thereof (for example the effect of globalisation and the gradual decline of the Westphalian model). It will 
provide a brief survey of the factors underlying the gradual shift in socio-political and economic power from 
states to TNCs. This chapter will also include an analysis of key concepts, such as the notion of a corporate 
entity and its degree of liability, in the context of the discourse of human rights. The main objective of this 
chapter will be to examine whether corporations can be held accountable for their complicity in state-












Chapter three: Experiments in Corporate Accountability – The focus of this chapter will be primarily on 
how TNC accountability for human rights violations has previously been dealt with in public international law, 
and what the current trends are in terms of mechanisms that may be used to hold corporations accountable. 
This chapter will also outline the historical context of the international movement to hold corporations 
accountable for human rights violations. 
Chapter four: The Transitional Context – Chapter four will contextualize the issues discussed in chapters 
two and three within the context of democratic transitions from authoritarian rule. The focus in this chapter 
will be specifically on South Africa and how it has attempted to deal with issues of corporate complicity post-
transition. This chapter will focus on mechanisms such as the TRC as well as other more current 
mechanisms which attempt to deal with issues such as corporate social responsibility. 
Chapter five: Conclusion – This chapter will serve as a review of the findings made in the course of the 
thesis with possible recommendations, relevant to corporate accountability for human rights violations. 
Chapter five will reflect on the outcomes of the issues discussed in the paper, and give a brief summary of 
the arguments and pertinent points presented in the paper. 
1.10 Conclusion  
“The rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or the calculus of social interests.”
73  
Our questions in regard to the accountability of TNCs are intertwined with notions of justice. At an abstract 
and conceptual level the present thesis raises the question whether justice requires that TNCs should be 
held accountable for complicity in human rights violations. More specifically, can it be just to have different 
degrees of accountability for natural and juristic persons?  
The position of TNCs within the international human rights landscape is at odds with the tremendous weight 
and value attached to human rights in the globalized world. In the face of this global human rights 
hegemony, TNCs and their behaviour relating to human rights violations have been relatively un-policed. 
Although there have been a number of public and civil society awareness campaigns about TNC behaviour 
in relation to labour standards, scant attention has been paid to corporate behaviour in politically precarious 
circumstances. Given the fact that authoritarian states and their agents have frequently been perpetrators of 
human rights abuses, corporations operating within their ambit can all too readily become complicit in human 
rights abuses through their association with, or assistance to, such states, in order to benefit financially.  
Ultimately, it is not a matter of prohibiting or limiting lucrative corporate behaviour and investment, but rather 
of increasing their degree of accountability; for TNCs are important actors on the world stage who should 
accordingly have a corresponding and proportional degree of accountability for their part, be it direct or 
                                                     












indirect, in human rights abuses. It appears that international law may serve as the best means of 
implementing accountability measures, given the trans-jurisdictional operations of TNCs. And yet as it 
stands, and what this work aims to elucidate, the current standards of accountability in international public 
law for TNCs are far from stringent. 
Although, as noted above, the history of human rights discourse is ancient, the question of human rights and 
business is a novel one, which has only really taken root in the late-twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, 
in the later phase of globalisation. That being said, it appears to be one of the more pressing issues of the 
twenty-first century, in an age where human rights discourse has entered the mainstream and where 
corporations appear to be the new world superpowers. It is accordingly imperative that there be mechanisms 














Chapter Two: Conceptualizing the Business-Human Rights Paradigm  
“What is the purpose of an economy? If it is not solely for the well-being of the people who live within it, what is 
an economy for?”74 
This chapter serves as an exposition of the background and theoretical underpinnings of the business-
human rights debate. It begins with a discussion of what may be understood by a corporation, and how its 
juristic „personhood‟ has shaped its relation with human rights (given that a corporation is a juristic person 
comprised of natural persons). It then moves on to what can be understood by the term „transnational 
corporation‟ (TNC) with a view to its jurisdictional consequences at national and international levels.  
The second chapter also investigates the notion of corporate accountability both from a historical perspective 
and in its contemporary relevance, particularly in the realm of public international law. The trends and 
processes that have informed the business-human rights paradigm will also be explored including that of  
globalisation as well as the growing power exerted by market forces, and so of TNCs, in a globalized world. 
This chapter then closes with a look at the emergent international human rights framework and the available 
legal instruments to human rights law in general. This chapter aims to build upon chapter one and explore 
how conceptions of the corporation and of human rights have informed the quest for accountability of 
corporations for their complicity in violations of human rights. 
Ultimately this chapter aims to examine (i) the extent to which there is a lacuna in international law with 
regard to corporate accountability for complicity in human rights violations; and (ii) whether corporations can 
in fact be held accountable for complicity in human rights violations, particularly in terms of international law. 
2.1 Human Rights 
In order to better understand and grapple with the discourse of human rights and its relationship with 
corporations, one needs to consider what is understood by the somewhat amorphous notion of “human 
rights”. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights for the United Nations (OHCR) concisely 
defines the parameters and nature of human rights (in terms of international law) and subdivides them into 
three main categories of rights:  
2.1.1. first generation rights are the civil and political rights (for example the right to freedom of 
expression, and the rights to freedom from torture and slavery); 
2.1.2. second generation are the economic, social and cultural rights (for example the rights to 
health, education and social security); and  
                                                     












2.1.3. third generation rights are collective rights (for example the rights to development, to self-
determination, to peace and to a clean environment).  
All these categories of human rights are nevertheless deemed to be indivisible and worthy of equal respect 
and enforcement. Animating the discourse of human rights is the principle of non-discrimination, which is at 
the heart of, and central to, all human rights and is an important principle in international human rights law, 
and a guiding force in a number of international human rights treaties and conventions. The principle of non-
discrimination prohibits discrimination on a number of grounds, including race, sex and religion and applies 
to all people and in relation to all human rights. The principle of non-discrimination works in tandem with the 
principle of equality. The discourse of human rights contains the modality of rights and duties, with states 
assuming the primary obligations under international law regarding the enforcement and protection of human 
rights. Accordingly, states are entrusted, in terms of international law, with protecting both individuals and 
groups against human rights violations, as well as being tasked with taking positive measures to ensure the 
“enjoyment” of human rights. Individuals, by the same token, are entitled to enjoyment of their human rights, 
while respecting those of others.75 
The traditional view of human rights is primarily state-centric, with states considered to be the key subjects of 
international law, with corresponding human rights duties and obligations. Accordingly, in the traditional view 
of human rights, only states are considered to be being human rights violators. Therefore on a superficial 
view, it appears difficult, if not impossible or legally incorrect, to include non-state actors, such as 
corporations within this domain; as Anthony Clark Arend observes: 
“…states are still the main actors in the international system and the primary creators of international 
law. Even though non-state actors exist, and, in some cases, these non-state actors have entered 
into international agreements, these actors do not enter the process of creating general international 
law in an unmediated fashion. In other words, the interactions of non-state actors with each other 
and with states do not produce customary international law. Only state interactions can produce 
custom.”
76 
2.2 Corporate Identity  and Accountability – The Transnational Corporation (TNC) in International 
Criminal and Civil Law Jurisdictions 
The reach and power of corporations has expanded exponentially along with the intensification of the 
globalisation process from the mid-twentieth century. In terms of their resources and global reach some 
major corporations are indeed larger than most states today.77 TNCs are also increasingly trespassing on to 
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terrain that was once the sole preserve of states thereby disturbing the delicate balance that existed in 
international law. Under international law states have long been the most powerful global presence as well 
as the primary actors, compared to other non-state actors who do not have extensive obligations under 
international law. Accordingly, new mechanisms are required to deal with this change in circumstance, as 
transnational corporations increasingly emerge as a strong counter to state-based power. Certainly TNCs 
have pervasive power well beyond the parameters of the market place, and broad social and political 
influence. The transnational corporation must be understood and examined as a pivotal player in the 
globalized world. As Micklethwait and Wooldridge tellingly observed: 
Nowadays, the influence of this unsettling organization is even more pervasive. Hegel predicted that the basic 
unit of modern society would be the state, Marx that it would be the commune, Lenin and Hitler that it would be 
the political party. Before that, a succession of saints and sages claimed the same for the parish church, the 
feudal manor, and the monarchy … They have all been proved wrong. The most important organization in the 
world is the company: the basis of the prosperity of the West and the best hope for the future of the world.78 
However, this rise in significance and power of corporations has not been accompanied by a corresponding 
increase in legal or other ways of holding them accountable.  It may be argued that, in part, the general lack 
of accountability of corporations stems from the nature of the corporate structure itself. Traditionally, 
corporations have been afforded the benefits of the doctrine of separate legal personality. In terms of this 
notion the company is considered to be a separate juristic person from the natural persons who control the 
administration of company assets.79 This doctrine, in essence, shields the assets of the human executives of 
the corporation from potential creditors. It is only in rare situations (for example where the separation was in 
fact a sham created with fraudulent intent) that a court will pierce this „corporate veil‟80 and treat the 
corporation and its executives as one and the same. This conception of separate legal personality, 
moreover, only relates to the situation where natural persons are in charge of the assets of a company, and 
does not relate to the parent-subsidiary relationship where “one company owns and controls another”.81 This 
is, of course, a crucial feature of the organisational structure of transnational corporations (TNCs). The 
parent-subsidiary structure is one usually employed by TNCs, with the parent company being incorporated in 
one state (the „home state‟), with various subsidiaries incorporated within their particular „host states‟. The 
different jurisdictional bases of the parent and subsidiary companies may then be used as a “jurisdictional 
veil” to extend the doctrine of separate legal personality to the relation between the parent company and its 
subsidiaries.82 The subsidiary is considered a juristic person of another jurisdiction, and is accordingly 
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incorporated under a different legal system to its parent company. Accordingly, the question then arises as to 
whom in fact to hold accountable when corporations and/or their subsidiaries have been complicit in human 
rights violations, or in fact how to hold the corporation accountable in light of these distinctions between the 
TNC and its subsidiaries as well as that of juristic and natural persons. 
Muchlinski does, however, suggest an approach for dealing at least with the new parent-subsidiary dynamic. 
Drawing on the work of Blumberg83 and Strasser84, he suggests the use of enterprise analysis. Enterprise 
analysis adopts a “substance over form” approach, and seeks to tease out and examine the actual nature of 
control between the parent and subsidiary companies, in order to look at the group structure holistically and 
to determine whether in fact the parent is in de facto control of the subsidiary. Therefore, where it can be 
shown that the parent company exerted control over the subsidiary, the malfeasant behaviour of the 
subsidiary may be attributed to the group, and the parent company will not enjoy separate legal personality 
or limited liability from the consequences of the malefactions of its subsidiary.85 This may increase the 
likelihood of, and create further grounds upon which the „corporate veil‟ may be lifted.86  
More generally Muchlinski advances the view that the corporate veil should be pierced where it is in the 
interests of justice to do so and not only in circumstances where the doctrine of separate legal personality is 
being abused or misused. For Muchlinski this would encourage a legal order where parent companies would 
be liable for the malfeasance of their subsidiaries, even if the parent were only indirectly involved in such 
wrongdoing, and would provide an incentive for parent corporations to implement better policies and be more 
diligent in their operations. Furthermore, parent corporations would no longer be able to hide behind the 
“jurisdictional veil”, as the parent‟s and subsidiary‟s actions would be deemed to be one and the same.87 It 
bears mentioning, although trite, that a parent company may be held jointly liable with its subsidiary, where 
both were directly involved (by act or omission) in the commission of the offending act.88  
In light of the above and with the gradually evolving nature of corporations, and of TNCs in particular, their 
degree of accountability for complicity in human rights violations needs to be accordingly amended. 
Therefore as the powers of TNCs have been augmented, and as they assume more responsibilities which 
were previously the preserve of the state, so should their obligations and degree of accountability be 
increased; TNCs should not be permitted to hide behind the corporate veil and the doctrine of limited liability. 
In the words of Garth Meintjes, “the idea of a corporation as a legal fiction without responsibilities is no more 
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sacred or accurate than the idea of unfettered state sovereignty.”
89 Therefore as there are checks-and-
balances for every player on the global stage, TNCs should be no exception. 
In actual practice, though, the position of TNCs in international criminal law is a complex and elusive matter if 
also one that is currently undergoing some potentially significant changes. The UN Norms90 define a TNC as 
any juristic body involved in a profit-making venture in a number of countries (more than two countries), 
whatever the composition of the corporation, or the countries in which it has operations, and regardless of 
how many persons undertake such profitable endeavours.91 Given the typically complex internal structure of 
TNCs, the parent company may have little formal authority over its subsidiary, although the subsidiary may 
effectively be required to follow policy devised by the parent company. It nevertheless remains a separate 
juristic person incorporated in another jurisdiction. States, the main actors under international law, generally 
respect the principle of territoriality and will typically not interfere in other territories by implementing human 
rights policy or obligations in relation to foreign nationals in a foreign territory or state.92 Accordingly, “home 
states” have been disinclined to chastise parent companies in regard to human rights violations committed 
by their subsidiaries in foreign territories (host states).93 Moreover, no covenants of customary international 
law oblige home states to control the activities of TNCs in other territories.94   
Historically, TNCs have been dealt with (on the rare occasions they have been held accountable) in terms of 
human rights violations, primarily through the criminal law. There has, however, gradually been a shift 
towards using the civil law as an avenue for redress – particularly the remedy of reparations, with the 
majority of these matters settled out of court for vast, undisclosed amounts.95 In particular, a U.S. statute, the 
Alien Tort Claims Act96 (ATCA), has come to prominence as a mechanism for seeking civil redress, in 
particular reparations; a topical example being the Khulumani97 case, which will be examined in further detail 
in chapter three. The history of civil cases against corporations for human rights violations is a fairly recent 
development, mainly played out in U.S. federal courts, thanks in most part to the ATCA. The first case to 
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successfully use the ATCA in relation to human rights violations was the case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala98 and 
later confirmed and varied in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain99, and of course, most topically, the current case of 
Khulumani v Barclays Nat‟l Bank Ltd.100  
2.3 Globalisation and the State-Corporate Power Paradigm  
As already indicated in 1.3 and 1.7 above the evolving process of globalisation has profoundly impacted on 
the traditional business-human rights paradigm, not least with regard to the increasing prominence of TNCs. 
At its core, and as previously stated, globalisation involves a process whereby the state-centric approach of 
the „Westphalian system‟, with its reliance on exclusive territorial jurisdictions, has an increasingly reduced 
significance. Territorial borders have become more deregulated and increasingly permeable to trade not only 
in goods, but also for the exchange of political and social ideologies.  
The traditional Westphalian system was premised on the model of sovereign nation states and the principle 
of territoriality (i.e. exclusive territorial jurisdiction). The Westphalian system came about as a result of the 
Peace of Westphalia of 1648 which heralded a new political order in which sovereign nation-states had 
exclusive jurisdictions with regard to domestic law but were precluded from interfering in the domestic affairs, 
even if these involved gross human rights violations, of other jurisdictions.101 In contrast, the emerging “Post-
Westphalian” world is characterized primarily by (i) a greater fluidity and permeability of sovereign borders 
and jurisdictions; (ii) the conflation of the distinction between the public and private spheres; and (iii) “the 
fragmentation of authority”.
102 In the wake of the globalisation process, the balance of power between states 
and corporations (in particular TNCs) has steadily shifted in favour of corporations with a gradual reduction 
of the concentration of power in the hands of the state.103 This power shift affords TNCs increasing 
opportunities to take advantage of the various jurisdictions of weakened nation-states – the „home states‟ 
and „host states‟ in which they operate.104  
Globalisation has been claimed by some analysts to represent the “end of geography”,105 while others have 
stressed the significance of the ways in which “[c]ultures, economies and politics appear to merge across the 
globe through the rapid exchange of information, ideas and knowledge, and the investment strategies of 
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global corporations.”106 Globalisation represents a grand shift in the functioning of the world economy and 
the international political order; it amounts to an increasing move from a territorially based and state-centric 
framework of international relations and law to a new interconnected order of geographic, social and political 
relations. As McGrew eloquently states (emphasizing the interconnectedness of the globalized world), 
globalisation is: 
“a process (or set of processes) that embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations 
and transactions, generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and 
power”.
107 
As this web of global interconnectedness expands and intensifies the conceptual and literal space between 
peoples is reduced; there has been a shift from a global world to a “global village”.
108 George Soros 
accordingly characterizes globalisation in terms of “the free movement of capital and the increasing 
domination of national economies by global financial markets and multinational corporations.”109 For our 
purposes the key feature of these developments is the interrelationship of the process of globalisation and 
the operations of TNCs – the two are closely interwoven. TNCs are both drivers and beneficiaries of 
globalisation.  
A survey of the relevant literature shows that, for varying reasons, globalisation has both proponents110 and 
detractors.111 For our purposes the crucial issues concern the implications of globalisation for human rights. 
These have been complex and ambiguous. On the one hand the spread of the discourse of human rights 
and the development of a global human rights movement is thanks, in part, to economic and political 
globalisation and the resultant interconnectedness of the world; as more people become aware of their 
human rights, this leads to a growing quest to hold individuals, states and corporations alike accountable for 
their involvement in human rights violations.112 On the other hand globalisation, and especially the increasing 
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reach and power of TNCs, has exacerbated the difficulties in holding them accountable for complicity in 
human rights violations.  
It is widely recognised, and no longer a contentious view, that as a result of globalisation power has been 
ceded by states to market forces113 (and so also to TNCs, as a driving force of the market). But it is still open 
for debate as to what extent the increasing economic power of TNCs infringes on the actual sovereignty of 
states. TNCs increasingly control the means of production across territorial jurisdictions, and so exercise 
increasing power through their ability to produce and control the flow of goods. Their power thus emanates 
chiefly from their control of access to the goods societies need to function.114 Peter Drucker has argued that 
such power effectively amounts to political power: greater control of access to resources inevitably confers a 
position of power in relation to others.115 However the more power TNCs gain this not only further 
subordinates the role of the state in the regulation of trade and transfer of capital, but also conversely 
politicizes the power of the TNCs, as states acquire an interest in regulating the actions of those who can 
determine the conditions of economic growth and capital flow.116 Accordingly, TNCs need to be held 
accountable for their newly augmented power, not least in the human rights arena. 
It has been contended that in this increasingly globalised world “corporations may have as much or more 
power over individuals as governments”.
117 There are approximately 82, 000 TNCs, employing 80 million 
workers operating in the world today.118 Transnational corporations produce approximately one-fifth of global 
wealth; the sales revenue of the nine leading TNCs outstrips the tax revenues of the majority of countries, 
save for those of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Japan.119 In addition, 
the annual turnover and economies of a number of TNCs dwarfs that of many countries; and individually the 
largest TNCs have annual sales superior to the gross domestic product of all but approximately twenty-five of 
the largest country economies.120 
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In light of the growth of the globalisation movement and correspondingly global connectivity, corporations 
particularly TNCS, today are spoilt for chose in terms of where they choose to set up their business 
operations.121 This has consequently led to a “„race to the bottom‟”122 with states competing for large 
corporate investment by having a legal environment amenable and inviting to the demands of big business, 
(without too many regulatory checks and balances). Globalisation has in turn also weakened the position of 
states “to regulate business” extraterritorially; as a result of the principle of territoriality which means that a 
state cannot use its law extraterritorially – beyond the geographical bounds of the state itself.123 Accordingly 
gives them limited control over the activities of their TNCs operating in other territories 
2.4 Corporations and Accountability for Human Rights Violations under International Law  
Human rights discourse has a rich history going back to the natural rights theories of Locke and Hobbes but 
it was only in the course of the twentieth century that notions of human rights were incorporated into 
international law. The International Nuremberg Tribunal represented the first occasion in history where 
individuals were held liable for human rights violations in terms of international law.124  
A key characteristic of rights discourses is that there are specified jural relations between rights-bearers and 
duty-bearers “against whom those rights can be claimed”.125 In terms of the classic Hohfeldian analysis rights 
and duties are correlative; accordingly rights come with correlative or corresponding duties (of other parties) 
to respect the rights held by the rights-bearer.126 Significantly, though, the development of international 
human rights law largely remained premised on the notion of individuals (natural persons) being rights-
bearers and accordingly other natural persons having correlative human rights duties. This has resulted in 
corporate actors being, to a significant degree, left out of the ambit of human rights discourse, and 
accordingly corporations have seldom, if ever, been considered as bearers of correlative human rights 
duties. Arguably this is a questionable absence, as corporations should have human rights duties 
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corresponding to the human rights claimed by natural persons, regardless of the fact that corporations are 
juristic persons. 
Any work attempting to address the issue of human rights, in part or in whole, cannot ignore the public 
international law framework from which it stems. At present, international law remains primarily focused on 
states, state officials and individuals with regard to issues of wrongdoing and accountability for human rights 
violations. Historically states have been considered to be not only the custodians of public international law, 
but also subjects thereof; that is, possessing “international legal personality”.127 In contrast, corporations are 
considered to be „objects‟ of international law, with rights and duties “conferred” upon them by states and 
which are only exercisable by states.128 That being said, the UDHR expressly stipulates that “every individual 
and every organ of society” has a duty to promote human rights.129 Moreover, a number of organizations, for 
example bodies of the UN, aside from individual natural persons, have been considered subjects under 
international law.130 Therefore, although states are the primary actors under international law this does not, 
however, mean they are the only actors. Still, this remains a contested issue in international public law; there 
is a school of thought which posits that corporations are accountable for “violations of customary 
international law, either directly or through national courts”.131 There is, however, a dissenting school which 
advances the contrary view that corporations are not, and cannot in fact be, subjects of international law, and 
should accordingly not have any human rights obligations in terms thereof.132  
Drawing on the work of Andrew Clapham who addresses issues of corporate accountability in his seminal 
work Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors133 the present study will examine the possible degree of 
accountability of corporations for their complicity in human rights violations and the critiques of such 
accountability mechanisms. Clapham uses the example of international organizations (IOs) such as the 
United Nations who, like states, as well as “certain parties to internal armed conflicts” have human rights 
obligations in terms of international law.134 He admits that the terrain is not as clear-cut in regard to 
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corporations but Clapham is nevertheless of the view that “there is no reason to believe that certain 
international law obligations cannot attach to non-state actors in the form of legal persons.”135 Clapham avers 
that international law incorporates duties for individuals “both in their public and private capacities” while IOs 
also have certain duties. There is accordingly no basis upon which to assert that corporations, or other 
actors, cannot have corresponding duties under international law.136  
Moreover, Clapham asserts that this inclusion of additional actors will not weaken the human rights regime; 
the human rights framework is in fact malleable enough to accommodate such adjustments: 
“I would suggest that the strength of the human rights system has always been its ability to adapt to new 
demands and new needs. There are now demands for protection from the effects of big business and non-
state actors. The human rights machinery and norms are pliant enough to be reoriented to cope with these 
new demands.”
137 
2.4.1 Critiques of Corporate Accountability  
Although a number of authors believe that there should be increased corporate accountability, there 
is by no means a unified voice in this regard, and in fact a number of critiques thereof have emerged. 
Clapham acknowledges that there has been far from overwhelmingly support of the view, to which 
he subscribes, i.e. that “non-state actors and private individuals have duties under international law”. 
He notes several key critiques, a number of which will be reviewed below: 
(a) “The Trivialization Argument” 
A number of theorists contend that introducing other actors, such as non-state actors, into the 
fray as having human rights obligations, would trivialize the traditional notion of human rights, as 
human rights duties would no longer be attached to, or rest solely on, the state. 138 In terms of 
this approach states should be the sole bearers of human rights obligations, and to do otherwise 
(by adding other actors) would dilute the importance of human rights, which bear special gravitas 
precisely because they relate directly to grave abuses by the state. This approach is in keeping 
with the traditional view of states as the only duty-bearers in terms of human rights law. Clapham 
counters that the founding human rights instruments, such as the UDHR, do not speak directly 
and solely to states alone, but also posit individual rights without mention of the state.139 
Accordingly, Clapham rejects this critique on two grounds: firstly he argues that there is no 
                                                     
135 Ibid, at p.30-31. 
136 Ibid, at p.31. 
137 Ibid, at p.22. 
138 Ibid, at p.33. 












veracity to the claim that human rights are only actionable against states, rather human rights 
appear to be more universal in applying to all people and actors – “human rights are to be 
respected by all persons, groups, and states, and that exceptional additional duties for the state 
have been explicitly articulated.” Secondly, he argues that the question of „trivialization‟ is a 
supremely subjective judgment or assessment – “[w]hat can be considered trivial depends on 
who you are and what are your interests”.
140 
(b)  “The Legal Impossibility Argument” 
The proponents of this view assert that it is a fiction in law to have non-state actors subject to 
certain duties or obligations in terms of international law. This is in light of the fact that 
international law and customary international law was born primarily out of state action; including 
(i) the signing and ratification of treaties (treaties which are only binding on the signatories 
thereto); and (ii) customary international law which results not from the signing of treaties, but 
rather from states acknowledging or accepting certain rules as binding on them. In terms of this 
approach non-state actors such as IOs may have human rights obligations under international 
law, but only where they have become a party to treaties initiated by states or through the 
application of customary international law.141 In addition, in terms of this argument, armed rebel 
factions may also be subjects of human rights law, but only where they have gained actual 
government status.142 
Clapham contends that in relation to armed factions this claim is spurious: in practice a number 
of armed movements that were not equivalent to a government, have in fact been probed in 
relation to the commission of human rights violations by, for example, the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone and the Guatemalan Historical Clarification 
Commission.143 Moreover, and more topically, terrorists groups have been considered as subject 
to human rights obligations, an assertion made by theorists, observers, NGOs, certain 
governments, and central UN bodies, such as the General Assembly, alike.144 Clapham argues 
that this willingness to amend human rights law to include terrorists as having human rights 
obligations is “ushering in an era where states acting in the United Nations are willing to attach 
human rights obligations to non-state actors in general and to terrorists in particular.”145 
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Moreover, Clapham asserts that the definition of human rights has evolved; “the term „human 
rights‟ has generated meanings and significance beyond the realm of international legal 
obligations owed by states.”
146 Accordingly, to delimit or prohibit the inclusion of non-state actors 
within the ambit of this definition is illusory; and Clapham finds such claims unpersuasive – 
“excluding any obligations for non-state actors through appeals to the „definition‟, „essence‟, or 
„original sense‟ of the term „human rights‟ are unconvincing.”147 
(c) “The Policy Tactical Argument” 
According to Clapham, this argument is premised on the contention that governments may, as a 
tactical move, opt to focus on the obligations of non-state actors in order to deflect attention 
away from the state‟s own human rights violations to those perpetrated by rebel groups or armed 
militia thereby legitimizing the government‟s own reprisal actions in relation to such actions. By 
casting terrorist groups as bearers of human rights obligations the state  can be viewed as 
simply acting to prevent human rights abuses (committed by the rebel groups); “[i]n this way, 
human rights law may be cynically captured and abused to justify further oppression.”
148  
Clapham asserts that in fact U.S. legal precedent has been relatively swift in acknowledging that 
corporations do in fact have obligations in terms of international human rights law.  Citing the 
Talisman
149 case Clapham notes that Judge Schwartz in that case concluded that: 
substantial international and United States precedent indicates that corporations may also be 
held liable under international law, at least for gross human rights violations. Extensive 
Second Circuit precedent further indicates that actions under the ATCA [Alien Tort Claims 
Act] against corporate defendants for such substantial violations of international law, including 
jus cogens violations, are the norm rather than the exception.150 
Accordingly, in light of such domestic precedent for holding corporations liable for human rights 
violations, Clapham sees no reason why corporate actors should not also have similar 
accountability in terms of international law. 
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2.4.2 Clapham’s Approach to Human Rights Violations by Non-state Actors 
For Clapham, there is clearly room for non-state actors within the international human rights system, 
and it is important that they be acknowledged as important human rights concerns. Historically 
human rights have functioned as a check on state power but that does not restrict their applicability 
to non-state actors within the private sphere. He observes that “while [human rights] have protected 
private power, they also contain the seeds for action against private power – in the same 
jurisdictions that have historically curtailed public power when such power has threatened private 
autonomy.”
151 However, Clapham is aware that the application of such human rights obligations to 
non-state actors is not common to all jurisdictions: “With a multiplicity of jurisdictions for human rights 
claims, we have to accept that human rights obligations may attach to non-state actors in some 
jurisdictions and not in others.”152 
Moreover, Clapham asserts that there is no reason to view international human rights law as fixed; 
human rights are relatively malleable and there is nothing prohibiting their evolution to include 
violations of human rights by non-state actors even if states are the primary agents in this regard. 
Furthermore, it appears that the enjoyment of human rights is not merely predicated on an 
individual‟s relationship to the state; as Clapham observes –  
“we can legitimately reverse the presumption that human rights are inevitably a contract between 
individuals and the state; we can presume that human rights are entitlements enjoyed by everyone to be 
respected by everyone.”
153 
Ultimately for Clapham the human rights obligations of non-state actors cannot be ignored, and it is 
clear that such obligations exist, even if they are unenforceable in certain jurisdictions. In his view 
“international human rights obligations can fall on states, individuals, and non-state actors. Different 
jurisdictions may or may not be able to enforce these obligations, but the obligations exist just the 
same.”
154 (Emphasis added). 
Clapham‟s approach to holding non-state actors (including corporations) accountable for human 
rights abuses is premised on the traditional notion of states being the primary actors and law-making 
authority and bearing obligations under international law. His approach, however, goes further and 
advances the view that some traditional public law obligations should also be applicable to non-state 
actors. Clapham advocates a shift in international human rights law in order to hold accountable all 
actors capable of violating international human rights law; therefore he concludes that “the existing 
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general rules of international human rights law, created and acknowledged by states, now fix on non-
state actors so that they may be held accountable for violations of this law.”
155 This will evidently 
have major implications for TNCs involved in, or complicit with, human rights violations. In relation to 
the current debate as to whether corporations are in fact subjects of international law, and 
accordingly possessed of international legal personality Clapham implies that corporations do in fact 
have “limited international personality”.
156 
Clapham does not, however, completely discount the importance of the state and acknowledges its 
continued value and worth, along with that of non-state actors:  
“I would also argue that public international law can apply in the networks and sectors that focus on 
duties for non-state actors. And, I would suggest we can construct such a framework without the 
existing law of state responsibility crumbling and without inappropriately legitimizing the relevant non-
state actors.”
157 
Clapham contends that the reluctance to recognize corporate international legal personality is 
premised on two grounds: (i) the fear that “foreign corporations would somehow be able more easily 
to interfere in the political and economic affairs of states if they were acknowledged to possess a 
degree of international legal personality”; and (ii) “a fear that these foreign corporations would be 
able to trigger excessive diplomatic protection for national companies of the host state where the 
foreign nationals are controlling shareholders in those national companies.”
158 But for Clapham there 
seems no justifiable basis upon which to exclude other non-state actors as long as some credence is 
given to the notion of individuals having certain rights and obligations under customary international 
law and international humanitarian law: 
“As long as we admit that individuals have rights and duties under (?) customary international law and 
international humanitarian law, we have to admit that legal persons may also possess the international 
legal personality necessary to enjoy some of these rights, and conversely to be prosecuted or held 
accountable for violations of the relevant international duties.”
159 
Clapham‟s key point is that if natural persons enjoy human rights and obligations, it is not peculiar for 
juristic persons also to enjoy such rights and obligations. For example, in the case of the South 
African Bill of Rights, “a provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the 
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty 
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imposed by the right”.
160 However there is a caveat to this enjoyment of these rights for juristic 
persons in terms of the Constitution as “[a] juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights 
to the extent required by the nature of the rights and the nature of the juristic person.”
161 Therefore 
one must be cautious in attributing all human rights, and the enjoyment thereof, by natural 
individuals wholesale to juristic persons, as it is clear that certain human rights cannot equally be 
applied to, or enjoyed by, a juristic person (such as the right to human dignity).162 Regardless thereof 
all juristic persons are bound by a duty to observe the human rights of others.  
Clapham comments that his approach appeals to the effectiveness principle: “If international law is to 
be effective in protecting human rights, everyone should be prohibited from assisting governments in 
violating those principles, or indeed prohibited from violating such principles themselves.”163 For 
Clapham the problem is that attempts have been made to treat issues of subjectivity, international 
legal personality and international capacity as one in the same, accordingly diminishing the possible 
understanding of non-state actors being considered as bearers of human rights obligations – “[t]rying 
to squeeze international actors into state-like entities box is, at best, like trying to force a round peg 
into a square hole, and at worst, means overlooking powerful actors on the international stage.”164 
Therefore Clapham is ultimately of the view that “various non-state entities have enough 
international legal personality to enjoy directly rights and obligations under general international law 
as well as under treaties.”
165  One cannot help observing the implications of Clapham‟s view for 
TNCs, particularly in light of the evolving nature of corporations and their augmented powers which 
should come with corresponding duties, and accordingly accountability. The lack of a more extensive 
framework for the accountability and obligations of non-state actors in international human rights law 
will result in an accountability vacuum with regard to non-state actors, and TNCs in particular. 
Although states may have been historically acknowledged as the most important actors on the 
international law plane, a reluctance to recognize the changing world order and the rise of the power 
of the corporation could in fact reduce the legitimacy of human rights. International law should give 
better effect to the importance of human rights as a yardstick for ethical conduct by all persons, both 
natural and juristic, as well as the human rights duties and obligations all persons have towards each 
other. As such obligations attach to all persons it would be unreasonable to include state actors (who 
are juristic persons for all intents and purposes) and other non-state [juristic] actors such as 
individuals, rebel and terrorists groups, while excluding some non-state actors, such as corporations 
or TNCs, who arguably wield even greater power. As Clapham suggests, in order for international 
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law to be “effective” in safeguarding human rights it needs to ensure that “everyone” has a duty not 
to violate human rights directly or indirectly or to assist governments in the violation thereof.166  
In the final analysis human rights do not exist solely by virtue of individual relations to the state, but 
simply by virtue of being human. Therefore if those rights are being impinged upon by any actor, 
such actor must be held directly accountable without having to go through the relevant state 
involved. This applies especially in circumstances where the state concerned has a poor human 
rights record and does not value human rights. Similarly, in circumstances where TNCs are acting in 
politically unstable territories and may be complicit in state-sponsored human rights violations, the 
relevant states are unlikely to hold them accountable‟ In such circumstances the imperative to hold 
TNCs directly accountable seems far greater; it becomes imperative to have the correct 
accountability mechanisms, in terms of international law, to deal with such corporate malfeasance 
and complicity in human rights violations.  
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
Chapter two aimed to examine the issue of whether corporations can in fact be held accountable for their 
complicity in human rights violations. Intuitively, the immediate response would be a resounding answer in 
the affirmative, but upon canvassing the landscape, one realizes that the answer is not that categorical. 
Particularly in terms of international human rights law, which places profound importance on the role of the 
state as the bearer of human rights obligations and the state is the conduit through which human rights 
issues are to be addressed. In practice, though, this comes up against the reality of authoritarian and other 
states which do not value the preservation of human rights. Moreover, this does not take account of the 
increasing role and significance of TNCs, the more so in close association with human rights violations by 
authoritarian states.  
That being said, human rights are not a static concept, and are sufficiently flexible to encompass other non-
state actors; indeed, if human rights are to have a greater impact globally this is a shift that needs to occur. 
From our review of the development of human rights and the relevant human rights principles, and in terms 
of international law as it currently stands, the case for the inclusion of other non-state actors as having 
human rights obligations appears strong, even compelling. In principle that implies that corporations, TNCs 
in particular, should and can be held accountable for their complicity in human rights violations. However, in 
actual practice and law that remains a challenge  
As we have seen the lacuna in international law in relation to corporate accountability stems primarily from 
the primacy placed on the role of the state. Moreover, traditionally states are considered to be the principal 
                                                     













subjects of international law, and correspondingly the only bearers of human rights violations, with 
corporations merely being „objects‟ of international law whose rights and duties are conferred upon them by 
and only exercisable by the state. 167 What may, however, be gleaned from the above is that the nature of the 
corporation is changing, in some ways almost usurping the power of the state as an important international 
actor; for their part international human rights are malleable and the international law system is flexible 
enough to be amended to accommodate this change in the global political-legal milieu; and there is no 
coherent prohibition against corporations being held accountable for human rights violations. Accordingly 
TNCs can and should be held accountable for complicity in human rights violations. 
In light of this proposition that corporations should be held accountable for complicity in human rights 
violations, an examination of what accountability mechanisms are in fact available needs to be made. Hence 
in chapter three an exploration of accountability mechanisms will follow. The chapter will open with a brief 
description of the history of accountability mechanisms and the current trends in relation thereto. The chapter 
will then aim to contextualize these issues of accountability within the zone of political transition. An 
examination will also then be made of accountability in the South African context, with a focus on the TRC 
and its business sector hearings. 
The following chapter, building upon the issues of accountability explored in this chapter, aims to examine (i) 
what mechanisms have been previously used and (ii) what the current mechanisms are in terms of holding 
corporations accountable for human rights violations; and (iii) indeed the prospects of success of such 
mechanisms. The subsequent chapter, following on from these theoretical discussions, will also address the 
practical considerations emanating from the aforementioned theories, and how the interplay between 
business and human rights has been traditionally addressed and what, if any, are the emerging and current 
trends.   
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Chapter 3: Corporate Accountability Mechanisms 
Building upon the issues of accountability addressed in the preceding chapter this chapter will examine, what 
mechanisms can in fact be used to hold corporations accountable for complicity in human rights violations. 
First we will look at how issues of corporate accountability have been historically addressed and then 
consider what the current trends and mechanisms are for holding corporations liable for human rights 
violations in which they were complicit. 
As discussed in chapter 2 the issue of corporate accountability is complicated by the corporation‟s 
ambiguous status as a juristic person composed of natural persons. These complications are multiplied in 
the case of a TNC as a distinct enterprise comprised of a parent company in the jurisdiction of one state and 
subsidiaries in the jurisdictions of other states, with coordinated operations involving significant transborder 
trade and production of goods.168 
A gradual trend does, however, seem to be emerging towards increasing corporate accountability for 
complicity in human rights violations. There are three key corporate accountability mechanisms that warrant 
attention; namely (i) state responsibility; (ii); soft law norms; and (iii) corporate governance.. These three 
mechanisms may collectively (or separately) be used to hold corporations accountable in varying ways and 
with varying degrees of success. The problem is therefore whether corporate accountability for complicity in 
human rights violations should be sought by legal and judicial means or through internal efforts at improving 
corporate self-governance. 
Historically, corporations, in the limited extent to which they have been held accountable by legal and judicial 
means, have primarily been held accountable only for direct human rights violations committed by them; in 
few if any cases have corporations been held accountable under the law with regard to corporate complicity 
or indirect involvement in human rights violations, up until the late twentieth century. This is nevertheless 
important history to observe, however, as it created the foundation for the increasing numbers of corporate 
complicity matters to come. 
Traditionally, and particularly in light of the doctrine of separate legal personality, the corporation itself, as an 
entity, has always been considered beyond the purview of judicial accountability; only the individual 
members (as the human agents of the corporation) were liable, in very limited circumstances, for the acts of 
the corporation; as Hobbes already observed: “If a Mulct be laid upon the [corporate] body for some unlawful 
act, they are only liable by whose votes the act was decreed, or by whose assistance it was executed…”.169 
In this limited sense emphasis has always been placed on the legal accountability of the human agents of 
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the corporate entity, rather than that of the corporate entity itself.170 Therefore, historically there has been 
little acknowledgment of corporations themselves being accountable, and the shift in an alternative direction 
only began in earnest in the wake of World War II and the Nuremberg Trials. 
This chapter will first discuss the history of the development of corporate accountability for human rights 
abuses. It will be contended that these developments have only recently come of age with the dawn of the 
twenty-first century. 
3.1 History of corporate accountability – the Nuremberg Trials 
At the end of World War Two (WWII) in June 1945, the Allied Forces (composed of the United Kingdom; 
United States of America (USA); France; and the former Soviet Union) aimed to create an international 
judicial vehicle of accountability for the state-sponsored human rights violations committed by the German 
Reich. The International Military Tribunal (IMT) was created as a judicial mechanism for trying individuals in 
terms of the newly introduced concept of international human rights law. Perpetrators were tried in their 
personal capacity, regardless of their relationship with the state in a series of trials at the Palace of 
Justice.171 
The premier trial before the IMT was the Trial of Major War Criminals, held in terms of the London Charter 
of 8 August 1945. 172  This trial ran from 20 November 1945 until 1 October 1946 and tried twenty-two 
individual perpetrators, who were high ranking officials of the German Reich, as well as a number of 
political and military organizations; including the SS and the Nazi Party.173 The Trial of Major War Criminals 
is of great importance for being the first time in history where individuals were tried in terms of international 
law for crimes that were considered to be against international peremptory norms (ius cogens norms)174. 
Telford Taylor, Chief of Counsel for War Crimes elucidated three imperatives behind the establishment of 
the Trial of Major War Criminals at Nuremberg; namely that (i) “all men are bound as a matter of law to 
observe the “standards of conduct generally observed in civilized countries”; (ii) those who violate such 
standards are liable to be prosecuted by tribunals in terms of international law; and (iii) these standards 
make it a criminal offence, in terms of international law, to (a) plan and execute an “aggressive war”, (b) 
violate “the laws and customs of war generally observed among belligerents”, and (c) persecute certain 
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groups on racial, religious or other grounds.175 Therefore the aim of this Nuremberg Tribunal was to 
prosecute those allegedly guilty of committing offences that ran contrary to the global human rights order 
and international law standards and norms. 
The Nuremberg Tribunal effectively created a new international ethos with regard to state sanctioned 
human rights abuses. Perpetrators of human rights abuses could no longer invoke the justification of doing 
their duty in terms of „superior orders‟, while those in positions of authority had to accept the implications of 
their „command responsibility‟. Therefore individual state agents, senior individuals as well as their foot 
soldiers, were held accountable under the law. This provided a precedent for the development of 
international human rights law, which enabled the criminal prosecution, in terms of international law, of 
individual state agents who did not respect international ius cogens norms, and human rights in 
particular.176  As Teitel observes, as a result of Nuremberg “the paradigm of accountability shifts from 
national to international processes and from the collective to the individual.”
177  
From 1947 until 1949, a second set of trials began, geared towards holding German industrialists liable for 
their involvement in the commission of international crimes.178 The focus here will be on this second set of 
trials held in terms of Control Council Law No. 10179180 – the Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg 
Military Tribunals (Second Nuremberg Trial). The Second Nuremberg Trial prosecuted individuals who 
were not highly ranked within the Nazi regime but who had close ties to, and provided extensive support, 
financially and otherwise, to the Nazi regime. The defendants included doctors (who had performed 
medical experiments on reluctant subjects from concentration camps); members of the judiciary; members 
of various SS organizations; and members of the diplomatic and administrative core.181 In particular, within 
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these proceedings, three German industrialists trials were held; namely the Krupp Trial,182 IG Farben 
Trial183 and the Flick Trial184. These three cases will be the primary focus of our examination. 
The defendants (all directors of their respective companies) in the Flick Trial, I.G. Farben Trial, and Krupp 
Trial were indicted, inter alia, for war crimes and crimes against humanity such as enslavement; the 
plundering and spoliation of occupied territories and the exploitation of their inhabitants; the seizure of 
plants in occupied territories; the persecution of Jews; membership in a criminal organization (e.g. the SS); 
and crimes against peace by assisting in the execution of wars of aggression and wars in contravention of 
international treaties.185 In the Flick Trial three of the six indicted defendants were acquitted, while three 
received sentences ranging from two and a half years to seven years (Friedrich Flick received a sentence 
of seven years).186 In the Krupp Trial one of the twelve indicted defendants was acquitted, eleven were 
found guilty and received sentences ranging from two years to twelve years (Alfred Krupp, along with two 
other directors, received a sentence of twelve years).187 In the IG Farben Trial of the twenty-four 
defendants indicted, twenty-three were tried, ten were acquitted, and thirteen were found guilty and 
received sentences ranging from one and a half years to eight years (Carl Krauch received a sentence of 
six years).188  
Approximately thirteen trials were held in total at Nuremberg after WWII, with 200 individual prosecutions, 
38 acquittals and less than 38 death sentences, and the remainder were sentenced to prison sentences 
ranging from eighteen months to life.189 And of the total of 300 individuals tried and thirteen cases heard 
during the Nuremberg Trials, 177 individuals were prosecuted and twelve cases were heard before the 
Second Nuremberg Trial.190  
Ultimately, the Nuremberg Trials prosecuted individuals for corporate involvement in the perpetration of 
human rights violations by the Nazi regime. Therefore the Nuremberg Trials pioneered judicial 
accountability of individuals, but not of corporate actors.  
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3.2 Current trends in corporate accountability: State responsibility 
Traditionally, states have been considered to be the only actors who are possessed of international legal 
personality with corresponding rights and obligations; moreover in terms of international human rights law 
states act as the primary vehicle for the enforcement of human rights values.191 States that have signed 
and/or ratified human rights treaties are bound to respect and protect human rights, to prevent human 
rights abuses from occurring, and to remedy the occurrence of such abuses.192 Accordingly, much of the 
responsibility for human rights remains at a state level. In terms of international law, each state is duty 
bound to enforce and protect human rights, and ensure the observance of such rights by all actors or 
“entities” operating within its territory or control.
193 There is, however, no obligation on states to ensure the 
observance of international human rights principles by corporations, incorporated within their territory, also 
in these corporations‟ “extraterritorial” operations.194 Therefore with respect to TNCs the home state only 
exerts state responsibility over the TNC incorporated in its territory – i.e. operating within its jurisdiction, 
while host states have responsibility for subsidiaries operating in their respective territories and 
jurisdictions.195 In practice these multiple and split jurisdictions preclude the effective functioning of state 
accountability mechanisms with regard to TNCs.    In light of the augmented global power of TNCs, as 
noted in chapter one, this state-centric vision is highly problematic for the application of international law in 
relation to TNCs.  
For Florian Wettstein, TNCs have acquired increasing power as a result of two primary factors: (i) they 
enjoy control of the means of production across territorial jurisdictions, and can therefore “determine 
outcomes in the global production structure”; and (ii) they have extensive bargaining power and influence 
because of the “dependencies” created by their control over global production processes.
196 Moreover, 
TNCs have the technical know-how, knowledge and information; since innovation is a key driver of 
economic globalisation and of the market in general, those who have access to the most information or 
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knowledge have crucial advantages in so far as “[k]nowledge and innovation have become the single most 
important factors of competiveness in the global economy”.
197 Moreover, the privatization of knowledge by 
large corporations increasingly forces states to form liaisons with these corporations in order to have 
access to such knowledge and to stay developmentally relevant, progressive, and ultimately competitive. 
Wettstein contends that significant state powers have already been ceded to large corporations and TNCS. 
Nowhere was the predominant position of corporations more pronounced than in the economic crisis of 
2008, when states bailed out a number of captains of industry, a move which was considered altruistic by 
most, but was in fact necessitated by the stranglehold large corporations have on fiscal economies. States 
cannot afford to see these big corporations fail; TNCs are ultimately now the true bastions of global 
economical and political power.198 Therefore there is a palpable reluctance on the side of states, both host 
states and home states alike, to hold TNCs accountable for their human rights conduct or to monitor and 
“regulate” their human rights behaviour, particularly extraterritorially.
199 
From the above it is manifest that in relation to TNCs it has become quite outdated in international relations 
and law to still retain the Westphalian system, where states are considered to be the primary mechanisms 
for accountability under international law. TNCs no longer occupy the same position as (national) 
corporations did prior to globalisation, and have further entrenched themselves as important players on the 
international stage. However, despite their newly augmented global economic and political power, the 
human rights obligations of corporations in terms of intern tional law remain unclear.200 In actual fact, 
considered as accountability mechanisms, states “have ceased to be of singular importance”.201 Looking to 
the state for mechanisms to hold TNCs accountable is a misapprehension which in effect does the whole 
international system of human rights a disservice; indeed it may in fact lead to further human rights 
violations and abuses. Smith reiterates that the traditional framework of international relations and law fails 
to recognise the multiplicity of key players in the current globalising context: “the multiplicity of actors in 
transnational relations, the proliferation of new forms of governance and the permeability of domestic legal 
orders by international norms‟ have made this structure unsuitable for the complex globalised world”.
202  
Not only are TNCs becoming arguably more powerful than most states, they are de facto also acquiring 
certain rights in terms of certain international and bilateral treaties. It follows that TNCs should have 
corresponding duties in relation to such rights: “[i]t would seem more than reasonable to argue for symmetry, 
that power, authority and rights should imply duties, obligations and liabilities. More specifically, that TNCs 
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should be held responsible directly for complicity in violations of human rights law”203 (emphasis added). 
Therefore at present, states and international law are not wholly effective in providing the required 
accountability mechanisms in relation to TNCs.  The prospects for state-based accountability mechanisms 
are difficult to predict, however, given the reluctance or resistance of states to prosecute malfeasant 
corporations, due to the augmented power of corporations, the prospects are far from promising. 
3.3 International Conventions: “Soft Law” Corporate Accountability Mechanisms 
It is manifest, that state-based accountability mechanisms are not sufficient to address the issue of corporate 
accountability for complicity in human rights violations. Accordingly, aside from state responsibility in terms of 
international law, there are also a number of international instruments which attempt to increase corporate 
accountability for human rights violations. 
In conjunction with new forms of corporate self-governance there has recently been the development of a 
number of International Conventions or “soft law” (voluntary, non-binding) instruments for holding 
corporations accountable for human rights violations. Currently there are f ur key instruments which deal 
with transnational corporations, namely; (i) the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) Guidelines;204 (ii) the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
concerning Multi-national Enterprises and Social Policy (ILO Tripartite Declaration);205 (iii) the United Nations 
Global Compact;206 and the (iv) Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (Draft Norms).207 We will briefly consider each of these 
as possible accountability mechanisms relevant to corporate complicity in human rights violations.  
OECD Guidelines 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines were adopted on 21 June 
1976. They serve, as their name suggests, merely as a guideline in terms of good corporate behaviour for 
OECD-based companies. The principles underlying the OECD Guidelines are relevant to a wide range of 
topics, including the environment, employment or labour, consumer protections, competition, and science 
and technology.208 But inter alia they could also be considered as providing for possible accountability 
mechanisms in relation to the growing number of human rights violations committed by TNCs that had begun 
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to emerge. However, such accountability mechanisms would clearly have to take the form of corporate self-
governance rather than any externally imposed accountability under international law. 
The OECD Guidelines established a relatively sound monitoring system, making use of (i) “national contact 
points” who enforce the OECD Guidelines and address any pertinent matters within specific states; as well 
as (ii) the Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises whose members are 
representative of different states, and refine matters regarding the OECD Guidelines.209 
However, it is not clear that much can be expected from such accountability mechanisms based on self-
governance in actual practice. The OECD Guidelines have been heavily criticized for (i) not effectively and 
clearly delineating the human rights obligations of transnational corporations; (ii) not including any penalties 
for non-compliance; and (iii) providing a monitoring mechanism which does not appear to be sufficiently 
independent.210 Implementation has been weak and the OECD Guidelines consequently appear to have had 
limited success in actually reducing human rights abuses by corporations.211 
ILO Tripartite Declaration 
The ILO Declaration, approved in 1977, relates primarily to labour rights and labour issues, including health 
and safety standards.212 It is non-binding and voluntary, although it has a monitoring system which includes a 
routine survey of the success and extent of the implementation of its provisions. It has had limited effect in 
relation to corporate accountability for human rights. The key critiques of the ILO Tripartite Declaration are 
that (i) it relates specifically and solely to labour rights (and consequently neglects other human rights); (ii) 
only a small number of parties have adopted the ILO Declaration; and (iii) its monitoring mechanisms are not 
effective.213  
Global Compact 
The Global Compact was proposed at the Davos World Economic Forum in January 1999, by Kofi Annan, 
Secretary General of the UN at the time, as a voluntary “global compact of shared values and principles.”
214 
The Global Compact “asks companies to embrace, support and enact, within their sphere of influence a set 
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of core values in the areas of human rights, labour and the environment”.
215 The Global Compact contains 
ten principles focused on: human rights (two principles);216 labour “standards” (four principles; the 
environment (three principles); and corruption (one principle). Companies that have voluntarily joined the 
Global Compact, undertake to observe its ten principles, and to report their degree of successful compliance 
and enforcement therewith either in their annual reports or similar public corporate reports; and must in 
addition submit a short description of (or post an internet link to) this report on the Global Compact website. 
This Communication on Progress (COP), which is an annual progress report to be submitted by participants, 
must highlight or outline the implementation of the ten principles. Should a signatory fail to submit the COP 
this will result in the participating business being delisted as a participant from the Global Compact‟s public 
database.217 The submission must be made by a signatory within two years of becoming a signatory to the 
Compact (and every two years thereafter).  
The Global Compact at present has close to 6000 participants from more than 135 countries.218 Apart from 
this limited success, it has come under heavy fire for not having a monitoring system or body in place. In 
addition it has been alleged that the ten principles are somewhat vague and indistinct. Moreover, the Global 
Compact is not binding on participants (but voluntary); therefore no severe repercussions are likely from any 
failure to adhere to its principles or to its reporting mechanism. That being said, the Global Compact has 
garnered substantial public interest and participation from the business sector. 
 UN Draft Norms 
The first tentative attempt at articulating the human rights obligations of transnational corporations as a basis 
for their accountability for human rights violations was made with the proposal of a set of Draft Norms. The 
Draft Norms were adopted in August 2003 by the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights, a subsidiary body of the UN Commission on Human Rights219 and paved the way for future 
human rights accountability in relation to corporate behaviour.220 However, in April 2004, the UN Commission 
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on Human Rights chose not to approve the Draft Norms and held that the Draft Norms had “no legal 
standing”.
221 
In terms of the Draft Norms TNCs were to apply the Norms to all their contracts and agreements:  
Each transnational corporation or other business enterprise shall apply and incorporate these Norms in their 
contracts or other arrangements and dealings with contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, licensees, 
distributors, or natural or other legal persons that enter into any agreement with the transnational corporation or 
business enterprise in order to ensure respect for and implementation of the Norms.222 
The Draft Norms did, however, make use of the oversight function of the state, as TNCs were subject to a 
system monitoring their implementation of the Norms as well as a reporting mechanism, indicating their 
degree of compliance with the Norms.223 Therefore a recommendation in the Draft Norms was that states 
enforce implementation and enforcement of the Norms by TNCs, as well as ensuring their adherence to both 
international and domestic law: 
States should establish and reinforce the necessary legal and administrative framework for ensuring that the 
Norms and other relevant national and international laws are implemented by transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises.224 
The Draft Norms were somewhat controversial in that they conferred obligations onto corporate actors that 
were traditionally considered to be the preserve of states; in particular by recognizing a duty on 
“transnational corporations”
225 and “other business enterprises”226 to protect and respect “human rights”.227 
However, states were still regarded as the primary accountability mechanism for corporate human rights 
violations and complicity –  
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States have the primary responsibility to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and 
protect human rights recognized in international as well as national law, including ensuring that transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises respect human rights. Within their respective spheres of activity 
and influence, transnational corporations and other business enterprises have the obligation to promote, secure 
the fulfilment of, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in international as well as national law, 
including the rights and interests of indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups.228 
Therefore in terms of the Draft Norms, although corporations had these human rights obligations, states 
retained their position as primary duty-bearer and accountability mechanism in relation to human rights 
issues.229  
A number of critiques have been leveled at the Draft Norms. Although the Draft Norms represent a 
mechanism for augmenting TNC accountability for human rights abuses, they do not go far enough in 
guaranteeing the preservation of these regulations by the host state; primarily because they are  
(i) merely voluntary, and (ii) no real punitive measures are in place for non-adherence to the Draft Norms.230 
Moreover, there is considerable incentives for states to ignore these Draft Norms in order not to alienate their 
corporate benefactors (as TNCs are often more powerful than states), particularly in developing countries.231  
This line of thinking is evident in the South African government‟s initial submission in the Khulumani case, 
staunchly opposing the litigation, and arguing that it could harm present and future foreign direct investment 
by large corporations.232  
Although the Draft Norms were not adopted by the UN Commission on Human Rights due to the discontent, 
particularly from the business community, surrounding them; instead the Sub-Commission requested the 
appointment of a Special Representative on the issue of business and human rights.233 The Draft Norms, 
nevertheless, represented an important step forward, as they delineated an extensive list of human rights 
that corporations had to observe in their operations.234 The Draft Norms may be regarded as representing 
represent the first step towards creating international human rights standards for corporate actors.235 
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3.4 Corporate Governance Mechanisms  
Although these soft law instruments have been instrumental in terms of prescribing particular duties and 
standards in relation to human rights that corporations may adhere to, a number of corporations have 
adopted an alternative approach of creating their own internal accountability mechanisms, which are not 
subject to external control or monitoring. Therefore these accountability mechanisms are predicated on self 
or internal regulation as opposed to external accountability or regulation and do not involve the state, or 
international law, or judicial accountability, but seek to promote an alternative self-governance based 
approach to corporate accountability..  
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
While the notion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has not been specifically concerned with corporate 
accountability for human rights violations, and in important ways pertain to a quite different domain (e.g. in 
being generally policy-oriented and forward-looking rather than being justice-oriented and backward-looking), 
it nevertheless provides a significant example of an alternative approach to corporate self-governance and 
possible accountability mechanisms. CSR has been defined in varying ways and in fact comes in many 
forms, but at its core it relates to corporations undertaking an endeavour or project not solely related to profit-
making but aimed at (i) perpetuating a social good, as well as (ii) being more conscientious and ethical in its 
profit-making ventures. A cogent definition of CSR has been proffered by The World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development: 
“Corporate social responsibility is the continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to 
economic development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as well as of the 
local community and society at large…”
236 
Therefore CSR programmes are aimed at addressing the needs not only of company shareholders, but also 
those of other stakeholders, such as the community affected by company operations, as well as the 
environmental impact, and sustainability of the operations. CSR represents a move towards an 
accountability mechanism in the context of the relationship between corporations and the environment and 
society within which they operate.237 
A number of key criticisms have, however, been leveled at CSR; in particular that it is simply a form of 
„green-washing‟ by corporations, while no real effective changes are made, as ultimately the monetary 
interests of the corporation continue to outweigh those of other stakeholders or of the environment when 
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there is a conflict of interests.238 Moreover, in most jurisdictions, directors owe a fiduciary duty to act in the 
best interests of the company239 which usually implies making profitable decisions on behalf of the company; 
particularly where the profit benefits outweigh the potential negative publicity fallout. In addition, often CSR 
reporting mechanisms are weak and ineffective, as no clear reporting standards have been delineated.240 
 Voluntary self-regulatory mechanisms 
In line with the general notion of corporate self-governance voluntary self-regulatory mechanisms have 
proved to be attractive to TNCs and governments alike.241 These mechanisms are adopted voluntarily by the 
corporation concerned (i.e. the corporation is not legally bound to adopt such mechanisms) while compliance 
with the relevant principles or policy is self-monitored.242 A number of large TNCs, such as Royal Dutch/Shell 
and British Petroleum plc have such voluntary mechanisms in place.243 
There are, however, a range of such voluntary accountability regimes, not all of which have been exclusively 
developed by corporations themselves; a number of such regimes have been created in collaboration with 
NGOs, inter-governmental organisations, and “multi-stakeholder groups”.244 For example, the Voluntary 
Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPs) were established in 2000 through a “tripartite multi-
stakeholder initiative” between states (including the U.S., United Kingdom; Canada, Switzerland), NGOs 
(including Amnesty International; Human Rights Watch), and organizations with observer status (including 
the International Committee of the Red Cross).245 It relates specifically to companies involved in the 
extractive industry (for example mining) who make use of third party security personnel.246 The VPs were 
established to ensure that in the protection of the resources of the extractive industry no human rights are 
infringed upon. Companies who are currently participants in the VPs include AngloGold Ashanti, Anglo 
American, BHP Billiton and most recently Barrick Gold Corporation.247 The VPs are not binding, and the VPs 
ability to adequately regulate the implementation of the principles has been called in question.248 In addition 
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the VPs have been criticized for the “permissive language” employed therein in relation to corporate human 
rights obligations.249 
Such voluntary mechanisms for corporate accountability are problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
there is no uniformity or real universal standard of corporate accountability for human rights in terms of such 
instruments; secondly the human rights provisions are somewhat lenient and watered down.250 A key 
problem with such voluntary, self-regulation mechanisms is precisely the fact that they are voluntary, rarely 
with an independent monitoring or reporting body, thereby reducing the transparency of such instruments.251 
Therefore although such mechanisms are a step in the right direction, they fail to effect any semblance of 
legitimate corporate accountability. 
Human rights-based voluntary codes of conduct for corporations are not as novel a notion as they may first 
appear; rather there has been a gradual awareness within the international community of the need to move 
towards some form of accountability mechanism for big business. A landmark voluntary code of conduct was 
the Sullivan Principles.252 The Sullivan Principles were not widely ratified: only twelve large American 
corporations operating in South Africa at the time adopted the Sullivan Principles. Still the Sullivan Principles, 
even if not wholly successful, can be considered one of the first instances of adopting ethical standards for 
corporate conduct in the context of transitional justice.  
The Ruggie Framework 
The UN Draft Norms had been strongly criticized in particular by the corporate community, primarily for 
placing onerous duties on TNCs in terms of their human rights obligations, and thereby conflating the role of 
states and non-state actors (given that states are traditionally the primary actors in terms of international 
law).253 The Draft Norms, however, ultimately became a relic of the past, due to pressure from corporate 
lobby groups in particular. In the event this led to the appointment of a Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary-General on the issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations. In July 2005, John Ruggie 
was appointed as the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the issue of Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations. Ruggie was mandated to investigate and make recommendations in 
relation to improving the current protections against human rights abuses by TNCs, and to canvas the views 
of multi-stakeholders in order to create a comprehensive corporate governance framework.  
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Ruggie, in consultation with interested parties, went on to establish the „Protect, Respect and Remedy‟ 
Framework (Ruggie Framework). The Ruggie Framework is voluntary and non-binding (“soft law”). It is 
founded on three principles: (a) the duty to protect; (b) the responsibility to respect, and (c) access to 
remedy: 
(a) Duty to protect:  In terms of the Ruggie Framework states are entrusted with the primary duty 
to protect individuals and groups against the commission of human rights violations within their 
territory. This duty requires states to take active measures needed to prevent and/or 
investigate human rights violations and to provide access to remedial measures.254 In terms of 
international law, this state duty to protect is linked with the notion that other states may 
intervene and undertake this duty to protect if the state omits to do so itself.255  
(b) Responsibility to respect: Corporations, for their part, are simply required to respect human 
rights, and failure to do so may result in negative public opinion.256 This is not simply a 
responsibility not to disrespect human rights but entails taking active measures. The primary 
problem with this responsibility, however, is that there are no serious repercussions should a 
corporation fail to adhere hereto. Moreover, the use of the word “responsibility” rather than 
“duty” suggests that this is a far less onerous obligation than the state‟s duty to protect human 
rights. 
(c) Access to remedies: Associated with the state‟s duty to protect, is the duty to provide access 
to legal recourse for victims.257 
In 2008, the UN Human Rights Council endorsed the Ruggie Framework and extended the Special 
Representative‟s mandate until June 2011 in order to „operationalize‟ and „promote‟ the Framework. On 22 
November 2010, Ruggie presented the draft Guiding Principles for the Implementation of the „Protect, 
Respect and Remedy‟ Framework (Principles), for comments by stakeholders. The Principles were created 
in order to guide states, corporations, and stakeholders in the implementation of the Ruggie Framework, as 
well as stating what practical reforms said parties need to make. In June 2011, the Special Representative 
will present the principles to the UN Human Rights Council. 
3.5 Corporate Accountability Mechanisms in Domestic Law 
Although international law has represented the main forum in the quest for corporate accountability, the 
domestic sphere also represents an alternative avenue, particularly through criminal prosecutions. The fact 
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that individual members of corporations are now being held accountable for the complicity of their companies 
in human rights violations is itself evidence of the trajectory of domestic law, which appears to be moving 
towards stricter accountability for corporations (and their members) in relation to human rights. Indeed, what 
may be gleaned from current precedents is that domestic law may be one of the more successful 
mechanisms for holding corporations accountable for complicity in human rights violations.  
Although the majority of domestic cases have centred on the prosecution of individual members of 
corporations, strides have been made, particularly in the US jurisdiction, of holding corporations accountable. 
A topical example of prosecution for human rights violation under domestic law is the case of Frans Van 
Anraat, who in December 2004 was charged with being an accomplice in relation to the genocide and war 
crimes committed by Saddam Hussein (Van Anraat had allegedly supplied Hussein with a substance used in 
the manufacture of mustard gas). The District Court of The Hague held that van Anraat was indeed an 
accomplice in war crimes, through his supply of a substance used in the manufacture of chemical weapons 
which caused serious injury or death to civilians, in violation of international law.258 Van Anraat was, however 
acquitted of being an accomplice in the genocide charge, due to lack of evidence of his knowledge of the 
genocidal intent of the Iraqi government towards the Kurds.259 Van Anraat received a sentence of fifteen 
years imprisonment by The Hague District Court.260 This sentence was later increased to seventeen years by 
The Hague Court of Appeal.261 
Although domestic law represents an avenue for corporate accountability for human rights violations, it is 
nevertheless a difficult mechanism to employ in relation to TNCs in light of their ability to transcend domestic 
corporate law, because of their global and transcontinental network; moreover, corporate law is not globally 
consistent or globally enforceable.262 
Historically, both in terms of international and of domestic law, the focus has been on the prosecution of 
individuals rather than corporations themselves. However USA tort law appears to stand in strong contrast to 
this tradition, as in terms of the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) corporations can in fact be held liable for 
“international crimes”.
263 A number of victims of human rights abuse have in recent times sought redress 
through the alternative avenue of domestic civil law, in particular the ATCA264. 
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Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) 
The ATCA is a 200 year old domestic statute in the USA which at the time had been promulgated in order to 
deal with the burdensome problem of sea piracy outside the territorial jurisdiction of the US. More recently 
use of the ATCA has been extended to cases of human rights violations (committed by natural or juristic 
persons) in a foreign country. The ATCA allows for the civil prosecution of non-state actors in US courts, 
even where the applicant is not a citizen of the USA; however the respondent or alleged perpetrator must 
have some minimum contact or presence in the USA. The ATCA is therefore fairly narrow in its scope with 
respect to the parties allowed to bring such an action as well as in the kinds of human rights violations it 
covers.265 But it does provide a legal basis for prosecution of those involved in human rights abuses in 
different jurisdictions. Use of the ATCA in relation to foreign parties came to prominence as a result of the 
Filatiga
266 case in the early 1980s, which was the first case in which the ATCA was used against an 
individual currently based in the USA, but who had committed a human rights violation in another country.  
The majority of the civil lawsuits launched in terms of the ATCA involve a TNC that did not commit any 
human rights abuses itself, but was rather complicit (particularly complicity in the form of “aiding and 
abetting”
267) in the commission of such abuses. These are the circumstances and cases regarding 
accountability for corporate complicity in human rights abuses of particular relevance to the topic and 
research question of this thesis. 
The first key victory against a TNC (for complicity in the form of “aiding and abetting” a human rights 
violation) pursuant to the ATCA came in 1997 with the Doe v Unocal case.268 The Unocal case was the first 
case in which a corporation had been indicted in terms of the ATCA.269 The Unocal case was, however, 
exceptional in that there was a clear, direct link between the corporation involved, Unocal, and the Burmese 
army‟s patterns of abuse of pipeline wo kers employed by Unocal. Moreover it could be shown that Unocal 
had been aware of the soldiers‟ behaviour. It was also shown that Unocal not only knew of, but profited from 
such human rights violations.270 Therefore Unocal‟s extensive complicity with human rights abuses could be 
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concretely proven in court in that a direct and substantial link was shown between Unocal‟s behaviour and 
that of the Burmese army.271  
In several cases, launched in terms of the ATCA, it has been held that “aiding and abetting” is an actionable 
ground.272 Richard Herz contends that there is sufficient legal precedent for corporate complicity in human 
rights violation, in particular “aiding and abetting”, as a ground for civil actions, particularly under the 
ATCA.273 The two rare exceptions were the first Khulumani case274 and Doe v. ExxonMobil.275 Moreover, 
Herz furthers that „[a]iding and abetting is a universally recognized norm of customary international law”.276  
The above cases all sought reparations or some form of redress from the TNCs involved. Reparations 
appear to be a fitting remedial mechanism, as corporations‟ primary motivation for committing, or being 
complicit in, the commission of human rights violations is profit or an increase in profit yield. Accordingly, 
holding them accountable by having them repay such victims (monetarily) seems to be particularly fitting. 
That being said, reparations (as a means of rectifying a moral wrong) are ofte  controversial; but may 
nevertheless be appropriate in circumstances of political transition, where corporations have been complicit 
in the commission of human rights abuses by the former regime.  
The US Supreme Court reiterated its stance on the legal standing of the ATCA in the 2004 decision of Sosa 
v. Alvarez
277 when it held that it is permissible for people to bring individual claims for human rights 
violations, no matter where they occurred in the world, pursuant to the ATCA. However, in Sosa the 
Supreme Court held that the aim of the ATCA was “to furnish jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of actions 
alleging violations of the law of nations.”
278 Therefore the scope of the ATCA was limited to those acts that 
could possibly lead to “serious consequences under international law”279 or that breached “definable, 
universal, obligatory, norms”.
280  Furthermore, the court went on to caution against the judiciary dealing with 
political matters (the court singled out the Apartheid reparations litigation specifically281) as these were issues 
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best suited to the executive branch – „the political question doctrine‟282– and doing otherwise would 
constitute a usurpation of powers by the judiciary (in terms of the separation of powers doctrine). In the Sosa 
case, the US Supreme Court also narrowed the categories of lawsuits that may be brought in terms of the 
ATCA and held that the ATCA only applies to prosecuting a very limited class of corporate complicity 
cases.283  
Critics of the ATCA believes it goes too far in holding TNCs liable for the complicity of subsidiaries involved 
in human rights abuses in host states and argue that this could have a damaging effect on foreign exchange 
and investment and the global economy as a whole, as plaintiffs should be seeking redress within their 
domestic courts, and by hearing such claims US courts are superseding another country‟s sovereign right to 
judicially adjudicate upon domestic matters.284  These critics‟ argue that corporations are not states (and 
should therefore not have to adhere to or abide by the same standards); their primary objective and task is 
profit-making and thus they cannot be held accountable for direct host state actions from which they 
(corporations) might indirectly benefit. Furthermore, some academics believe that the extension of the scope 
of the ATCA to deal with human right violations committed in other countries is merely an attempt by some 
opportunistic lawyers and law firms to be involved in a landmark case, or to gain the highest reparations 
award for their own profit, and that it is not ultimately about reparation for the victims.285  
In principle, the ATCA could, however, force companies to adhere to a certain code of human rights ethics in 
the course of doing business, similar to that applicable to states. Therefore having an accountability 
mechanism such as the ATCA may engender greater adherence by corporations to human rights principles, 
thereby making them more reluctant to be complicit in human rights violations, for fear of potential civil 
prosecution. That being said, the huge expense involved in lengthy litigation is an expense a large 
corporation may find easier to bear than the affected applicants who are most likely to be poor and from 
developing countries. Moreover, in light of the Sosa case, there are strict criteria to meet in order to proceed 
in terms of the ATCA, therefore although ATCA represents an option in terms of accountability mechanisms, 
it may be too onerous an accountability mechanism for applicants to utilize. In addition, recent ATCA cases 
suggest that use of the ATCA is available for very restricted use and that US curt‟s may be adopting a very 
restrictive approach in terms of the applicability of the ATCA.286 
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3.6 Concluding Remarks 
It would be an overstatement to say that the behaviour of corporations is completely unpoliced and that they 
enjoy complete unaccountability in current circumstances. However at best there is a form of „soft‟ corporate 
accountability, as the majority of accountability mechanisms are voluntary and non-binding. This evidently  
limits the degree of accountability and transparency required of corporations in relation to their human rights 
conduct. That being said, a discernable effort is being made in order to bolster these mechanisms. 
Ultimately, what may be gleaned from the above is that international law accountability mechanisms and 
accountability mechanisms in general, are in a state of flux. But it is clear from that there are no ready-made 
answers. In principle international human rights law should provide appropriate accountability measures in 
respect of TNCs, particularly as international law is not limited by the same territorial bounds as domestic 
law, as it can circumvent territorial jurisdiction. But in practice international law remains heavily state-centric, 
with very limited accountability mechanisms (voluntary, non-binding accountability mechanisms) currently in 
place for corporations. Nevertheless alternative accountability structures and mechanisms are being tabled; 
new accountability mechanisms may be on the horizon, but any such mechanisms would need the support of 
states and corporations alike. 
Historically, accountability has centered primarily on the individual or natural person, and the state. 
Accordingly, having corporations themselves being held accountable would be a significant departure from 
tradition; and as may be gleaned from the above, any attempts to move away from this tradition have been 
met with resistance. Hence the abundance of „soft law‟  and corporate accountability mechanisms, as these 
present a less stringent accountability mechanism for corporations, and accordingly relieves some of the 
burden on states who are reluctant to lose the good will and investment of corporations who now wield 
extensive power. Therefore the prospects of success of each of these accountability mechanisms is limited 
as all the major parties concerned, corporations and states alike, are reluctant to push for serious change, as 
both have a vested interest in the status quo; as states can still give the illusion of having some control over 
the operations of TNCs, while TNCs can give the appearance of moving towards a corporate culture more 
respectful of human rights. 
This chapter has canvassed the general legal terrain in terms of the accountability of corporations for human 
rights abuses. Against the background the focus needs to be shifted to the specific location and role of 
corporations in periods of political transition. The following chapter will therefore contextualize the business-
human rights interplay, and corporate accountability for complicity in human rights violations, within the 
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specific context of political transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes; in particular in the South 














Chapter Four: Corporate Complicity in the Transitional Context 
Authoritarian regimes as well as transitions from authoritarian rule to new democracies represent distinctive 
and challenging contexts for corporations to operate within: they may provide enticing opportunities for 
profitable enterprises but also serious risks that corporations may become involved, directly or indirectly, in 
the human rights violations perpetrated by such authoritarian regimes. Corporate complicity in human rights 
abuses also poses special challenges to transitional justice. As discussed in the preceding chapters states 
are still regarded as the primary bearers of rights and obligation in terms of international human rights law. 
Accordingly states are the mechanism through which issues of corporate accountability are supposed to be 
addressed. However, in the context of political transitions from authoritarian rule, the host state may be 
unwilling or incapable to address issues of corporate complicity in the human rights violations under the prior 
autocratic regime. Corporations operating in these contexts may thus have been complicit in the human 
rights violations of the prior authoritarian regime; and yet there is no competent state to hold corporate actors 
accountable for the malfeasance, save perhaps for the home state. 
How is one to govern corporate behaviour and who can ensure corporate accountability for human rights 
violations in circumstances that are in flux and where all forms of accountability mechanisms – legal; political; 
societal -- are in flux or disarray? This is the unique problem posed by the context of transition from 
authoritarian rule where accountability mechanisms such as soft law, domestic law, or international law are 
not available. Therefore where does one turn? 
Drawing on the recent example of South Africa, this chapter will review how South Africa, as a country in 
political transition, attempted to address corporate accountability for human rights violations committed by 
the prior regime, and what lessons may be learned from the South African experience. 
4.1 Transitions from authoritarian rule  
Periods of transition, particularly of transitions from authoritarian rule, are not easy to navigate, given the 
number of issues that warrant addressing. How to deal with the quagmire of issues within this space is a 
question that has plagued political theorists and legal rights activists alike. In the words of José Zalaquett: 
“Experience has shown that dealing with transitional political situations is a new area of human rights 
practice that poses some complex ethical, legal and practical questions.”
287 Transitional justice is not, 
however, an invention of the mid-twentieth century, and war crimes tribunals go back for several centuries.288 
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How newly democratic governments are to respond to human rights violations committed under the prior 
authoritarian regime presents ethical, legal and political dilemmas. Political transition is a juggling act of 
“settling a past account without upsetting a present transition”.
289 
A key dilemma or issue emanating from such moments of political transition is the question whether the 
successor regime should either in the name of (retributive) justice prosecute perpetrators of human rights 
violations associated with the outgoing regime, or alternatively for the sake of political stability and to ensure 
the democratic transition forgive their actions – “the torturer‟s dilemma”.290 For transitional justice the 
question is ultimately one of whether to use punitive justice mechanisms (such as prosecution) or restorative 
justice mechanisms (such as truth commissions) in order to address these past human rights violations. 
Huntington, however, argued that in reality the type of transition concerned – whether an insurrectionary 
„overthrow‟, a „negotiated settlement‟, or a top-down „reform‟ -- determines the choice of transitional justice 
options adopted291 so that neither mechanism (prosecution or amnesty/forgiveness) represents a panacea 
for the successor regime.292  
Although Huntington as a political scientist argued for a cautious approach to prosecutions of the 
perpetrators of human rights violations post-transition, human rights lawyers and theorists have argued that, 
the constraints of international law demand the prosecution of those who commit violations in terms of 
international law.293 Thus Diane Orentlicher contended that although newly democratic states in the 
transitional context may be in a state of political, legal, and societal flux, they are not, however, relieved of 
their duties and obligations in terms of international law. Accordingly the successor regime is bound by its 
international law obligations, and where the prior regime failed to discharge certain international law duties, 
(for example the protection of human rights and the punishment thereof)  it is incumbent on the successor 
regime to do so  and may not ignore such international obligations through the promulgation of contrary 
domestic legislation.294 Orentlicher was prepared to concede that international law does not, however, place 
this obligation on states where such action would negatively impact on that state‟s “national interests”; there 
are however stringent criteria for any such exceptions.295 In this principled human rights law view the special 
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circumstances of transitions from authoritarian rule thus generally do not detract from the obligations on 
states to ensure accountability for human rights violations. Evidently this would apply to accountability for 
corporate complicity in human rights violations as well.  
4.2 South Africa: A Case Study 
4.2.1 Apartheid South Africa 
Ironically, in the same year (1948) that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was 
adopted by the United Nations, the National Party was elected into power and began to implement 
its policy of apartheid, premised on racial segregation in South Africa. The term „apartheid‟ means 
“separateness” in Afrikaans; as a political system and ideology apartheid was developed “as the 
solution to ethnic or racial pluralism”.
 296 At its core the apartheid system was an attempt to keep 
indigenous ethnic groups and „races‟ (in the South African context classified as „African‟/‟Black‟, 
„Coloured‟, „Indian‟, and „White‟) apart in all spheres of political, social and economic life leading to 
„independent‟ ethnic homelands, separate residential areas and racially differentiated education 
systems, in particular. In principle as well as in many concrete particulars apartheid involved 
sustained violations of human rights. Thus in 1948, the UDHR as a bastion of human rights came 
into force at the same time that a goliath of racial discrimination and human rights violation came into 
its own and found its stride in South Africa. 
The world community took notice of the human rights abuses taking place under apartheid. 
On 30 November 1973 the UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention on 
the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (Apartheid Convention)297 
stating that apartheid was a “crime against humanity”.
298 In terms of the Apartheid 
Convention, States Parties to the Convention had to (a) prevent the occurrence of the crime 
of apartheid through the enactment of legislation “or other measures” in order to prevent the 
commission or “encouragement” of the crime of apartheid, as well as punish any persons 
who were guilty of such an offence; and (b) through the adoption of “legislative, judicial and 
administrative measures”  prosecute those found guilty of the crime of apartheid “whether or 
not such persons reside in the territory of the State in which the acts are committed or are 
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nationals of that State or of some other State or are stateless persons”.
299 Therefore only 
states party to the Apartheid Convention were bound by its provisions; accordingly if one 
was not a state party, one was not bound; and needless to say South Africa did not ratify the 
Apartheid Convention.  
4.2.2 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)  
Following the negotiated settlement and adoption of the Interim Constitution in 1993 and the 
founding democratic election and establishment of the Government of national Unity in 1994 the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established in 1996 under the auspices of the 
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (TRC Act).  The Commission 
operated for an 18-month period, which was later extended to mid-1998, while the Amnesty 
Committee continued functioning until 2001.  
The TRC‟s primary mandate was to investigate and determine  “as complete a picture as possible of 
the nature, causes and extent of gross violations of human rights” committed during Apartheid, solely 
during the period considered to be the height of Apartheid (1960 and 1994) “within or outside the 
Republic [of South Africa], emanating from the conflicts of the past”.
300 In terms of the TRC Act, a 
gross human rights violation was defined to include the killing, abduction, torture or severe ill-
treatment of any person (or conspiracy, incitement or instigation to commit such acts) while acting 
with a political motive.301  Delimiting the term “gross human rights” to this narrow categorization 
resulted in the exclusion of the structural and systemic features of the apartheid state; and moreover 
resulted in the exclusion of issues of corporate complicity in relation to the apartheid system. 
Accordingly, with this definition of gross human rights violations, the TRC limited the categories of 
accountability, and accountable actors, to a very limited class. This sentiment is echoed by 
Mahmood Mamdani who observes that this restricted focus of the TRC on this narrow category of 
rights neglected or failed to address the systemic nature of the apartheid system and the daily 
human rights violations perpetuated therein.302 Mamdani also brings forward the argument that a 
distinction must therefore be drawn between the “perpetrator and the victim” and the “beneficiary and 
the victim”;
303 although the TRC address the former, it failed largely to hold those who may have 
benefitted accountable. However, if using Mamdani‟s model, the categories of those who benefitted  
                                                     
299 See Article IV of the Apartheid Convention. 
300 Preamble of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995. 
301 “…„gross violation of human rights‟ means the violation of human rights through – (a) the killing, abduction, torture or severe ill 
treatment of any persons; or (b) any attempt, conspiracy, incitement, instigation, command or procurement to commit an act referred to 
in paragraph (a), which emanated from conflicts of the past and which was committed during the period  1 March 1960 to 10 May 1994 
within or outside the Republic, and the commission of which was advised, planned, directed, commanded or ordered, by any person 
acting with a political motive”, section 1(1)(ix) of the TRC Act.  
302 Mahmood Mamdani, „Reconciliation without Justice‟, Southern African Review of Books, November/December 1996.  












would not be easy to distinguish along racial lines, as some segments of the Black/African 
population, Indian, and Coloured communities also benefited from the racially stratified community; 
for example through reduced competition in certain areas; and the bureaucrats of the homelands.  
Secondly the Commission had the objective to seek out the victims of such atrocities and set up a 
system of reparations. Thirdly, the Commission would confer amnesty to the perpetrators of gross 
human rights violations as politically motivated crimes who individually applied for amnesty and gave 
full disclosure of their involvement in political atrocities (amnesty hearings). At the end of the process 
a report would be compiled, including notes on future strategies that could be implemented to ensure 
that such gross human rights violations would not occur or be permitted again in the future.  
A number of important characteristics distinguish the South African TRC from other truth 
commissions; in particular its emphasis on „public participation‟ in victims‟ hearings, and it was in fact 
the first Commission to do so.304 In addition, unlike other truth commissio s, the TRC had certain 
judicial powers: (i) it had an investigative arm charged with uncovering the veracity of claims and 
powers of search and seizure; (ii) it could also subpoena or call witnesses to testify; and (iii) it could 
grant amnesty to. The TRC, unlike its Latin American counterparts did not apply blanket amnesties; 
rather amnesty was granted to applicants on an individual basis and contingent upon the satisfaction 
of full disclosure and other requirements. Significantly perpetrators did not have to be remorseful in 
their exposition of the truth; however, in order to be granted amnesty they had to fully disclose the 
particulars of the gross human rights violation, and the crime had to be politically motivated.305 
Through full, open and frank disclosure of their involvement in political atrocities individual applicants 
could thus avoid criminal prosecution.  Significantly, for our purposes, the amnesty hearings only 
related to individual perpetrators and those who had been directly involved in politically motivated 
human rights violations. Accordingly the TRC did not provide for the question of corporate complicity 
or indirect involvement in human rights violations to be addressed within the ambit of the amnesty 
hearings. Certainly there was no provision for corporations to apply for amnesty to the TRC and so 
to meet the requirement of full disclosure of their possible involvement in human rights violations. 
Beyond the amnesty hearings, the Commission also conducted a series of sectoral hearings, related 
to particular areas of society, in order to investigate the extent of their involvement with the apartheid 
regime; including the (i) business hearings; (ii) chemical and biological warfare hearings; (iii) faith 
community hearings; (iv) health sector hearings; (v) media hearings; (vi) political party hearings; (vii) 
prison hearings; and (viii) women‟s hearings.
306 For our purposes the significance of these sectoral 
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hearings is that they did not focus exclusively on individuals, but rather on the systemic 
pervasiveness of apartheid and structural injustice. The focus in this work will be primarily on the 
business hearings, as they were intended to serve as a vehicle through which corporations could 
acknowledge any involvement with the apartheid regime. 
4.2.3 Corporations & the TRC: The TRC Business Hearings 
The TRC Business Hearings were held over the course of three consecutive days in Johannesburg 
from 11 November to 13 November 1997. Approximately 55 submissions (from the business sector 
and interested parties such as trade unions) were received by the TRC. A glaring omission was the 
failure by any of the multinational oil corporations, such as BP and Shell, to submit submissions to 
the TRC for the Business Hearings.307 In addition no representatives of the commercial agricultural 
sector participated in the hearings either.308 Furthermore, no TNCs made submissions before the 
Business Hearing. This was held by the TRC to be a grave omission, “in view of their prominent role 
in South Africa‟s economic development under apartheid”.
309  
Two key arguments arose at the hearings: representatives of the business sector argued that they 
had not benefited from apartheid. In their view apartheid had in fact been more economically 
detrimental to their activities and operations than beneficial, due to the lack of a skilled workforce. An 
opposing argument, evidenced in the submissions of liberal associations and organizations such as 
the African National Congress (ANC), and the Congress of South African trade Unions (COSATU), 
was that business ultimately benefitted from the racially skewed economic and commercial structure 
of the apartheid system, due particularly to the racial bias towards white economic growth, and the 
exploitative use of cheap clack labour.310 While these arguments pertained to general notions of the 
economic and social injustice of the apartheid system, they did not focus on the more specific issue 
of corporate complicity in gross violations of human rights as defined in the TRC Act. 
It was also further argued by some in the business sector that the realm of business was not the 
place to be enforcing the protection of human rights, as there were other mechanisms (introduced 
post-transition) such as the Constitution, the new Human Rights Commission and even elections 
which could lead to social reform and policy change.311  
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In its eventual Report the Commission, in its account of the Business Hearings, differentiated between 
three tiers of involvement in the human rights violations under apartheid, in order to differentiate between 
the different levels of accountability and to identify the sense in which corporations could be held 
accountable: 
(i) First order involvement: businesses (for example the mining industry)312 which had 
directly assisted the apartheid government to “design and implement apartheid 
policies”
313 were distinguished from those who had merely benefited from the 
policies of the apartheid regime. Accordingly, such businesses were held to have a 
higher degree of accountability than other companies.  
(ii) Second order involvement:  businesses which provided certain services or goods to 
the state, thereby indirectly contributed to the apartheid regime through their 
dealings or involvement with the state314 (for example, armaments suppliers,315 and 
financial institutions).316  Therefore by actively engaging with the repressive 
apartheid state through their supply of goods or services, such businesses should 
have been aware of the possible repressive use such goods could be put to [and 
how such goods and services would assist in maintaining the apartheid regime], and 
should accordingly not have had business dealings with the state. Consequently, 
such businesses were accountable as a result of their knowing contribution to the 
repressive practices of the apartheid state – “[s]econd-order involvement hinges to 
some extent on people knowing that their products or services would be used for 
morally unacceptable purposes”.
317 In the view of the Commission TRC complicity of 
this nature by companies with state repression raised accountability issues. 
(iii) Third order involvement: this referred to companies (for example white-owned 
businesses)318 which had benefited “by virtue of operating within the racially 
structured context of an apartheid society”.319  Even if they had not directly assisted 
the state in the creation of apartheid policy, or supplied goods or services 
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contributing to the repressive practices of the apartheid government, these 
companies had operated within the apartheid regime, and thus had a degree of 
involvement with it. Given the racially biased nature of the apartheid system, all 
white-owned business had benefitted from it, even without being directly involved 
with the state, inasmuch as the apartheid system was biased in favour of white 
enrichment (thereby further entrenching and maintaining the general economic 
inequality of the system.320  
As the TRC observed, although businesses lodged complaints and objections to the apartheid 
government in relation to the enforcement of apartheid policies, such objections were only lodged in 
relation to aspects of the apartheid machine, rather than in relation to the policy of apartheid as a 
whole. Therefore these objections against apartheid were generally self-interested, and only 
undertaken when business interests were negatively affected.321 
In its Report the TRC observed, with regard to the business sector, that although all „white‟ 
businesses did not benefit equally they all nevertheless benefited to some degree from the racially 
biased structure of the apartheid regime, which ultimately benefitted all white people, at the expense 
of exploiting black people. And although the business sector may not have been intimately involved 
in the formation of apartheid policy, it nevertheless benefitted therefrom and appeared reluctant to 
dismantle or amend the system, save where it directly and negatively impacted upon them.322 
In sum it appears from the TRC‟s sectoral hearing on the business sector that few companies were 
willing to acknowledge any malfeasance or complicity with apartheid repression on their part. 
Representatives of the business community were in fact overwhelmingly of the view that they had 
actually assisted and been instrumental in the dismantling of the apartheid regime, and had in fact 
been „victims‟ of apartheid themselves in the sense that apartheid, rather than augmenting growth, 
had stymied economic development.323   
Consequently, the sectoral hearings, and the business hearings in particular, are considered to be 
the nadir of the TRC process, as very little acknowledgement of complicity with the apartheid regime, 
or even indirect responsibility for state-sponsored human rights abuses, was tendered by any of 
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those involved in the proceedings, and few participants were contrite about their actions under the 
apartheid regime. Moreover, the participants asserted the view that business is about money-making 
and is far removed from the political arena, and accordingly they could not be accused of having 
been involved in political atrocities and the gross human rights violations committed by the 
government. 324 The lack of accountability of participants in the sectoral hearings was not lost on the 
Commission, and they acknowledged in the TRC Report the overarching lack of accountability 
emanating from the hearings.325 
Ultimately, in its findings on the Business Hearing the Commission held that the business sector had 
in fact (i) aided in the economic growth and sustainability of the apartheid regime;326 (ii) failed to 
acknowledge, and was not open to disclosing, the extent of its involvement with the apartheid 
government, as well as the extent of  its benefitting therefrom;327 (iii) the white agricultural sector had 
benefitted extensively from the racially biased distribution of land, and exploitation of cheap black 
labour;328 (iv) institutes such as the Land Bank and the Development Bank of South Africa were 
“directly involved in sustaining the existence of former homelands”;
329 (v) the mining industry 
benefitted extensively from the migrant labour system, exploitative wages for black workers, and 
poor health and safety standards;330 the “denial” of collective bargaining rights to black workers was 
a human rights violation; and “actions taken against trade unions by the state, at times with the co-
operation of certain businesses, frequently led to gross human rights violations”.331  
In its findings, the TRC held that no sector of South African society was unaffected by apartheid, and 
all sectors had in fact played a role in its proliferation and maintenance, particularly through their 
complicity, and stated that this complicity “relates both to the continuing perpetuation of race-based 
systems and structures and to a failure to speak out against the gross violations of human rights 
occurring throughout the society.”332 
Despite these findings by the TRC, no real tangible results emanated from either the TRC‟s sectoral 
hearings nor the Commission‟s Report; certainly not a wholesale apology from the business sector. 
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Therefore few tangible outcomes emerged from the Business Hearings, whether directly or in the 
form of substantial recommendations by the Commission. In the course of the Business Hearings 
Professor Sampie Terreblanche proposed the levying of a „wealth tax‟ on businesses, in order to 
remedy the unequal wealth distribution in South Africa and to further reconciliation, social stability 
and economic growth.333 Although this proposal for a wealth tax was considered by the TRC, it made 
no specific recommendation to this effect334 and the proposed wealth tax is yet to be levied against 
any companies. 
Nicoli Nattrass, a key advisor during the setting up of the TRC‟s Business Hearings, and also during 
the compiling of the final report335, concluded that this form of compensatory tax would be a too 
onerous burden for corporations to bear.336 She argued that an undifferentiated approach to a „wealth 
tax‟ fails to take into account the nuanced nature of involvement of business in apartheid repression, 
which the TRC itself acknowledged through its distinction of the three classes of involvement. This 
could ultimately result in the most blameworthy businesses being able to escape full liability for their 
actions, while more liberal companies are left the scapegoats for acts they were not involved in.337  
The TRC itself acknowledged the limited success of the sectoral hearings (including the business 
hearings), as well as the lack of buy-in by business. A minimal number of South African corporations 
(no multinational firms or banks) actually participated in the business hearings. The TRC received 
written submissions from only fifty-five South African companies, and those who did participate 
continued to assert the view, as advanced by Friedman that the “business of business is profit”, and 
is accordingly apolitical.338  Altogether this may actually have contributed to the “overarching sense 
of denial” stemming from the hearings.
339  
4.2.4 Critiques of the TRC’s Business Hearings on Corporate Accountability 
A primary criticism of the TRC process in general is that it produced a sanitized version of the history 
of apartheid violence itself, as it neglected the systemic nature and structural violence of apartheid 
and focused solely on specific incidents of gross human rights violations. This narrow focus negated 
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the pervasive role apartheid played in every sector of life and the impact it had on the movements 
and way of life of every black (and arguably also white) South African. The few who had been victims 
of gross human rights violations represented only a microcosm of a larger problem; in its exclusive 
concern with the relatively small number of perpetrators and victims of gross human rights violations 
the TRC neglected the relevant roles of much larger numbers of beneficiaries and bystanders. The 
Final Report has accordingly been criticized for failing to recognize the full gravity of the human 
rights violations, in that in focused solely on gross human rights violations, and neglected the 
omnipresent system that permitted these human rights violations on a daily basis affecting every 
aspect of society.340  The TRC failed to expand its purview beyond individual, politically motivated 
actions, thereby failing to adequately address other accountable actors and entities, such as 
businesses in general, and TNCs specifically. 
In his trenchant critique of the TRC, Mamdani observes, in regard to the TRC and its focus on this 
narrow category of human rights violations, “[w]e thus have a crime against humanity without either 
victims or perpetrators”.
341 Consequently, scant attention was also paid to accountability for indirect 
involvement or complicity in gross human rights violations342  (as evidenced by the creation of 
separate Business Hearings as opposed to the business sector‟s involvement in the amnesty 
hearings). The TRC therefore appeared to focus on one aspect of the apartheid regime (gross 
human rights violations committed against particular victims), rather than on the systemic violations 
perpetrated against a large proportion of citizens daily.343 The TRC accordingly skirted abuses that 
did not qualify as gross human rights abuses, such as those embedded in apartheid legislation, 
including segregation, and forced removals.  
4.3 Launch of the Khulumani case 
It may be argued that the lack of accountability for TNCs at the TRC, due its focus on individual perpetrators 
of gross human rights violations, led to the Khulumani and South African Reparations cases which 
addressed issues of TNC accountability for their complicity in human rights violations. In light of the failure of 
large TNCs to appear before the TRC and the Business Hearings, and the failure to effectively address the 
accountability of TNCs for their complicity in state-sponsored human rights violations; a group of South 
African plaintiffs attempted to seek redress through the civil law remedy of the American ATCA. 
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The Khulumani case was instituted in 2002, with the cause of action being that the defendant corporations 
had aided-and-abetted the Apartheid state in South Africa, particularly in its execution of programs of human 
rights abuse. This action was brought under the ATCA. Initially three groups of plaintiffs (the Digwamaje 
Plaintiffs; Ntsebeza Plaintiffs; Khulumani Plaintiffs) filed separate motions in US federal district courts against 
fifty defendant corporations who were alleged to have aided-and-abetted the Apartheid state.344. The 
Khulumani Plaintiffs (comprised of ninety-one individual plaintiffs) instituted their action against twenty-three 
domestic and foreign corporations for the alleged commission of human rights violations under international 
law. In contrast, the two other Plaintiff groups brought separate class actions suits (on behalf of an 
unspecified class and number of victims) against the defendant corporations. The Khulumani case aimed to 
hold accountable and receive reparations from all those companies that failed to appear before the TRC and 
admit the truth with regard to any complicity with the Apartheid regime in terms of the commission of state 
sponsored human rights abuses. The Khulumani Group is representing two groups of Apartheid victims: 
those who went before the TRC as well as those who failed to get an opportunity to do so. 
In the end the list of defendant transnational corporations (TNCs) was short-listed to a group of twenty-three; 
including major banks and corporations. These were further divided into those banks and corporations 
respectively incorporated in the United States of America; the United Kingdom; Germany; Switzerland; 
France; and the Netherlands. None of the defendant corporations are South African but all of them had 
South African subsidiaries or operations. The Plaintiffs‟ claims were later transferred to the Southern District 
of New York on application by the Ntsebeza Plaintiffs in 2002; all the claims now fell under the collective title 
of In re S. African Apartheid Litigation345. 
In July 2003 then South African Minister of Justice, Penuell Mpapa Maduna, submitted a scathing ex parte 
declaration to the New York district court on behalf of the South African government, stating that the court 
was interfering with a domestic matter; a matter in which South Africa, a sovereign state, had the most 
pertinent interest. Maduna contended that the court was therefore interfering with the South African state‟s 
and judiciary‟s ability to adjudicate on this matter within its domestic jurisdiction. In turn the US Department of 
State, on request from the district court, issued a Statement of Interest stating that the litigation of the matter 
would potentially negatively impact upon American interests and foreign relations. The USA was therefore 
hesitant to overstep the bounds of international comity. The doctrine of comity is an international norm 
holding that a state shall respect the sovereignty of another state and should not unduly interfere with its 
domestic matters within its territorial jurisdiction but afford the foreign sovereign the opportunity and respect 
to deal with its domestic situation itself and on its own terms.  
                                                     
344 In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 542 (S.D.N.Y 2004). 












On 29 September 2004 the federal court granted the defendants‟ motion to dismiss, and the Khulumani case 
was, along with the other Apartheid Reparation cases346, dismissed. The presiding judge (Judge Sprizzo) 
held that the applicant had failed to establish a substantial link between the corporations and the 
government‟s human rights violations. Judge Sprizzo dismissed the case on the basis that, although the 
corporations had benefited from Apartheid, they had not actively participated in the atrocities orchestrated by 
the then government.347 Moreover, mere collaboration with the offending government was not a sufficient 
ground in terms of international law upon which to institute an action; active conspiring and participation is 
needed348. In addition, the court held that the international conventions relied upon by the Khulumani Group, 
which condemned Apartheid as a crime against humanity and criticized any collaboration with the Apartheid 
government, were applicable only to states, not to non-state actors349. 
Judge Sprizzo‟s reasoning turned primarily on the issue of states being the only actors under international 
law, therefore the only entities capable of being held liable under international law for violations of 
international law. In addition, he held that the plaintiffs had not been able to prove a substantial link between 
the actions of corporations and the discriminatory machinations of the state; there was no evidence that 
these corporations were acting on behalf of the state350. In addition, he concluded that even if one could find 
a tenuous link between the Defendant corporations aiding and abetting state actions involving human rights 
abuse, any direct or indirect assistance given by said corporations was irrelevant as grounds for holding the 
defendants liable as this form of assistance was not yet an international norm akin to the one referred to in 
Sosa.351 Moreover, the Apartheid Convention352 had been ratified by only a handful of countries and could 
therefore not even be considered „binding international law‟, and so the Apartheid Convention did not meet 
the standard set out in Sosa353.  
Ultimately the Court felt that by trying the matter as a US court it would be infringing upon South African 
domestic jurisdiction and its state sovereignty; and that it would weaken foreign economic interest in South 
Africa.354 Moreover, the US government had expressed equal disquiet as the South African government in 
terms of the effect this litigation would have with regard to its international relations.355 Therefore it was held 
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by the Court that it would be trespassing into the realms of executive decision-making were it to adjudicate 
on this matter.356 
Following this decision, the plaintiffs in April 2005 filed for leave to appeal to the U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York.357 The appeal358 was heard and argued on 24 January 2006, 
and on 12 October 2007 the majority of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that 
the district court had erred in its judgment and therefore overruled the majority of its decision as it felt the 
lower court had misconstrued the key issues. On appeal this higher court therefore reversed the dismissal of 
the complaint. On 10 January 2008, the defendants petitioned the US Supreme Court for leave to appeal the 
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit‟s decision of October 2007. The US Supreme Court held that it 
could not rule on the matter as it lacked the necessary quorum, as four of its nine justices had to recuse 
themselves due to conflicts of interest. Consequently in May 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, permitting the lawsuit to continue. On 8 April 
2009, the (Southern District of New York) federal district court, in a judgment delivered by Justice Shira 
Scheindlin, held that the complaint would have to be limited to five defendants; namely Daimler, Ford, 
General Motors, IBM and Rheinmetall Group in order to proceed.359 Therefore only those defendants who 
had been clearly shown by the plaintiffs to have aided and abetted the apartheid state in the commission of 
gross human rights violations remain; corporations who had merely had business ties with the Apartheid 
South African government has been dismissed. 
In stark contrast to its earlier position, a further letter was sent in September 2009 to the court of Justice 
Scheindlin by the incumbent Justice Minister Jeffrey Radebe, on behalf of the South African government 
which, in light of the amended nature of the lawsuit, now unequivocally expressed its support of the case and 
its pursuance in American courts.360  
4.4 Prospects of Success 
There have been few successful cases against corporations pursuant to the ATCA (the majority of potentially 
successful cases have been settled out of court), and of the ones that have been successful, none was 
brought on the grounds of corporate complicity in human rights abuses.361 There are, however, clearly other 
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forums in which such legal actions can be brought (the ATCA is not the only avenue) but the ATCA remains 
the most popular avenue for redress. 
In the USA there is, however, an abundance of precedents in relation to TNC culpability for state-related 
human rights violations. An important court ruling in the Unocal362 case held that mere participation by a 
corporation with a malfeasant government (involved in the commission of human rights violations), with the 
knowledge of such malfeasance, is sufficient to hold that corporation liable for such violations in terms of the 
ATCA.363 But the overwhelming burden in terms of the ATCA is that in order for a perpetrator to be held 
liable, pursuant to the ATCA, said perpetrator must have committed such acts on behalf of or in collaboration 
with the state. The only crimes a perpetrator can be held liable for, without any relationship or involvement 
with the state, are the crime of genocide and war crimes. 364  
Morris Ratner has outlined four factors that he asserts determine the success of a reparations or ATCA 
suit.365 The first factor he defines is “historical research or informal discovery” this entails learning about the 
history (including print and media sources) of the relevant alleged atrocities, speaking to witnesses, and 
clarifying specifics about events and timelines, in order to identify principal defendants prior to launching the 
suit. Secondly, one has to determine whether the statute of limitations has run out on these claims, this 
means whether the time within which one could have instituted such an action against this entity or person 
has prescribed. In terms of the ACTA a plaintiff has ten years (from the date they had knowledge of the 
human rights violation) to institute their action, before their claim prescribes.366 Thirdly, the plaintiffs must 
show that the USA does indeed have jurisdiction to hear the matter and is the correct forum in which to do 
so. Therefore after identifying the alleged perpetrator, the plaintiff, must prove either a substantial link 
between the defendant and the USA, or show that defendant is in wrongful possession of certain assets, 
seized as a result of the human rights abuse or profiteered from said abuse; or plaintiffs must show that 
either the entity had a presence or was operating in or was incorporated in the USA or that the looted assets 
were deposited in the USA.367 Finally, and most importantly, the plaintiff bears the onus of proving the 
jurisdiction of the US Court to hear the matter.  
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
Chapter four has aimed to highlight the role of corporations in the context of transitional justice, and how 
accountability is a multifaceted concept, not least in relation to corporations. It has also attempted to 
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demonstrate some of the shortcomings when dealing with issues of accountability, particularly in relation to 
the South African example. 
This chapter aimed to relate the general issues in relation to the business-human rights paradigm, to the 
particular realm of political transitions; in particular the South African transition, in order to highlight, by way 
of a practical example, the manner in which such issues of accountability have been previously dealt with.  
What may be gleaned from the South African example is that adequately addressing issues of corporate 
accountability in periods of political transition is a difficult task for the successor regime. Although a number 
of legal accountability mechanisms are theoretically available to victims, which one to use is a highly political 
question, and the choice may disturb the precarious political climate of the country or damage fragile 
reconciliation endeavours. Nevertheless, these challenges are not insurmountable, but care must be taken, 
and notice must be given to the nature of the political transition – there is no „one-size-fits-all‟ solution. 
Ultimately, it is clear from the above that the transitional space is dynamic, and often the solutions emanating 
therefrom do not serve as an end in themselves, but rather as a step on a l nger path to true reconciliation 
and tangible outcomes.368 One of the most striking features of the Khulumani case was the choice by the 
plaintiffs not to seek civil redress through the domestic (South African) forum. The opportunity to seek 
criminal redress was precluded with the promulgation of the TRC Act and its amnesty provisions,369 which 
prevented the criminal or civil prosecution of perpetrators who were granted amnesty by the Commission.370 
In the AZAPO case,371 however, the applicants argued that the amnesty provisions of the TRC Act were in 
fact unconstitutional. The applicants in the AZAPO case argued that the provisions of s20(7) of the TRC Act 
were unconstitutional on the basis that they had a constitutional right to judicial redress.372 The applicants 
furthered that the amnesty committee was merely empowered to grant amnesty and not to decide upon 
“justiciable disputes” as defined in terms of section 33(2) of the interim Constitution.
373 The Constitutional 
Court held that the epilogue of the interim Constitution permitted the legislature to make such an amnesty 
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provision.374 Ultimately, the Constitutional Court held that the TRC Act and s20(7) thereof were not in conflict 
with the interim Constitution, moreover they were in fact authorised by constitutional provisions.375  Therefore 
in light of the fact that there was no alternative avenue for redress in South Africa, the plaintiffs in the 
Khulumani case had no alternative but to seek redress extraterritorially. This makes the South African 
experience, and the Khulumani case unique, as the political transformation in a way prevented particular 
forms of justice, aside from those prescribed by the TRC, being pursued. 
 
  
                                                     
374 The Constitutional Court observed to specific wording of the interim Constitution which stated that “„Parliament under this 
Constitution shall adopt a law‟ providing, inter alia, for the „mechanisms, criteria and procedures…through which…amnesty shall be 
dealt with‟” AZAPO, (paras 14-21). 
375 “In the result, I am satisfied that the epilogue to the Constitution authorised and contemplated an “amnesty” in its most 
comprehensive and generous meaning so as to enhance and optimise the prospects of facilitating the constitutional journey from the 












Chapter 5: Conclusion 
At the outset of this thesis, the aim was primarily to determine (i) to what extent corporations in general, and 
TNCs in particular, are held accountable under international human rights law for possible complicity in 
human rights violations; (ii) to what extent there is an accountability lacuna in international law; and (iii) how 
such accountability may be better enforced against corporate actors, particularly in the context of transitions 
from authoritarian rule; and (iv) what lessons may be learnt in this regard from the South African transition 
from apartheid to democratic rule. 
Ultimately what this thesis aimed to elucidate is that the terrain in relation to the interplay between business 
and human rights is not fixed, and a myriad of variables are involved in this interplay. 
5.1 Issues of Accountability  
After canvassing the literature, it would appear that in light of their increasing global power and their abil ity to 
affect human rights, it is axiomatic that corporations should be held accountable for their complicity in human 
rights violations; and that not having effective accountability mechanisms is a profound lacuna that requires 
urgent remedying. It is clear that this lacuna in international law is a result of the primacy given to state-
based judicial accountancy mechanisms. International law is state-centric, and consequently only states 
have obligations in terms of international law and have international law personality. Theoretically either the 
home state or host state could hold a TNC liable for human rights abuses in their respective jurisdictions. In 
practice there is no effective means for home states to hold transnational corporations liable for human rights 
violations they commit in host states; and there appears to be an overwhelming reluctance to do so. 
Moreover, given the nature of international law instruments, such as conventions and treaties, only states 
that have signed such instruments are bound by their provisions and may enforce them upon corporations 
either incorporated within their territory or operating therein.  
Although the notion of individual accountability for human rights violations had its genesis at the Nuremberg 
Trials, the Nuremberg Trials did not, however, create room for corporate entities to be tried under 
international law – therefore states and individuals were to be the only human rights obligation and duty 
bearers.376 The Nuremberg judgement expressly excluded “abstract entities”377 (which would likely include 
juristic entities such as corporations) from the purview of accountability under international law. This 
philosophy – the criminal prosecution of the individual rather than of the corporate entity – has continued to 
inform the human rights accountability discourse, hence the reluctance of states to hold corporations 
accountable for their complicity in human rights violations. Therefore at present, it may be quixotic to assert 
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that TNCs, given that they have global economic power rivalling that of states, should have human rights 
obligations mirroring those of state actors; as there appears to be a great unwillingness from states and 
corporations alike to have this happen.  
The follow-up question of how to hold TNCs accountable, however, is not as readily answered, as the how of 
accountability has a number of hurdles to its effectiveness. Firstly, on the legal plane, accountability requires 
proof of a causal nexus between the harm and the actors, and this becomes more complex with regard to 
complicity for human rights violations as complicity entails knowledge and indirect involvement. Complicity is 
a difficult standard to prove. And, the issue of what mechanisms of accountability – punitive “hard law” 
remedies or lenient “soft law” mechanisms – are best suited to serve as a remedy, is in itself contentious. 
From the mechanisms canvassed above, it is clear that individuals can more readily be held accountable in 
terms of criminal law than corporations. Therefore civil remedies (for example punitive fines; reparations) 
appear to represent the most suitable accountability mechanism for corporate entities. Such issues are, 
however, further complicated in the context of political transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule. 
5.2 The Context of Political Transition 
The context of transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy is unique in that the transitioning state‟s 
judicial and political institutions typically are in a state of flux; accordingly greater emphasis is necessary on 
international law and international law instruments to provide a semblance of guidance and a stable legal 
order. Furthermore, political transitions are an important context in terms of the business-human rights 
interplay as they represent a zone where TNCs can operate with relative impunity given the precarious state 
of the judicial and political system.  
The South African case represents an interesting example of the rigours involved in such accountability 
attempts in transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule. The lesson that may be learnt from the South 
African experience is that there is no „quick fix‟ to problems of this nature, no magic panacea. Rather 
incremental processes are required, as accountability for all actors will not emanate from a single 
accountability mechanism, such as a truth commission. The parameters of truth commissions, as may be 
gleaned from the South African experience, are primarily victim and individual perpetrator centred. 
Accordingly, other actors may be left out of the purview of the truth commission, thereby leaving a post-
transition society where certain juristic actors may be held unaccountable for human rights violations.  
Furthermore, within the South African example, no TNCs played a meaningful role in terms of acknowledging 
their complicity in human rights violations committed by the prior regime; as evidenced by their glaring 
absence from the TRC Business Hearings. Therefore this culminated in a later attempt by a number of 
victims to seek civil redress against such TNCs through the use of the ATCA. Accordingly, what may be 
gleaned from the South African experience is that one accountability mechanism may not be sufficient in 
order to address the involvement of and the varying degrees of accountability of all actors; consequently a 












context? As observed above, attempts at meting out justice post-transition must be premised on the nature 
of the transition, therefore no uniform standard can be used for corporate accountability in the context of 
political transitions. 
5.3 Post-Transition South Africa and transitional context outcomes 
Post-transition South Africa is a constitutional democracy, with one of the most progressive constitutions in 
the world. Aside from the Constitution which enshrines a number of key human rights in its Bill of Rights 
(rights which have horizontal application), significant new legislation and corporate governance codes have 
been promulgated relating to both environmental, social responsibility and racial transformation in line with 
the constitutionally enshrined rights to equality and dignity.378 In particular, the King Report on Governance 
for South Africa - 2009 (King III Report) and the King Code on Corporate Governance for South Africa (King 
Code), published on 2 September 2009, which prescribe corporate governance principles for companies 
operating in South Africa to adhere to.379 The King III Report makes use of the triple-bottom line or “triple 
context” reporting mechanism, in that companies who adhere to the King III Report and its Code must report 
on all aspects of the business, and the performance of the company will be assessed not only on the (i) 
financial, but also the (ii) environmental and (iii) social impact and performance of the company.380 
The King III Report is voluntary for private companies, however, public listed companies have stringent 
reporting requirements in relation thereto and are required to disclose their degree of compliance with the 
King Code (as amended from time to time), and are in addition required to adhere to certain prescribed 
corporate governance principles, as set out in paragraph 3.84 of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
Limited Listings Requirements.381 And a failure to adhere to these requirements may result in the JSE 
reviewing, suspending or terminating a listing of securities, or imposing a fine on a listed company.382 In 
addition, since May 2004, the JSE has had a Socially Responsible Investment Index (SRI Index), and 
although participation on the SRI Index is voluntary, in order to participate listed companies must adhere to 
certain JSE criteria.383 The SRI Index serves to “recognis[e] those listed companies incorporating 
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sustainability principles into their everyday business practices and to serve as a tool for investors to assess 
companies on a broader base” as well as to promote “responsible investing”.
384  
In addition, in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Companies Act), effective date 1 April 2011, a 
purpose of the Companies Act is, inter alia, to “promote compliance with the Bill of Rights as provided for in 
the Constitution, in the application of company law” as well as to “promote the development of the South 
African economy by...encouraging transparency and high standards of corporate governance as appropriate, 
given the significant role of enterprises within the social and economic life of the nation”.385 Therefore in 
terms of the Companies Act, companies operating in South Africa are required to observe the principles of 
the Constitution (including the Bill of Rights) when applying South African company law. South African 
common law also recognises the „enlightened shareholder value‟ doctrine, accordingly directors of 
companies are entitled to take the interests of stakeholders of a company, “including employees, the 
community, the environment, consumers”  into consideration, subject to the interests of shareholders.
386 
Even though these new accountability mechanisms are a positive step, directors of companies in South 
Africa, are still nevertheless bound by the fiduciary duty to always act in the best interests of the company, 
accordingly if there is any conflict between the pursuit of social or environmental good, and the pursuit of 
profit, the latter will prevail.387 South Africa is nevertheless taking progressive moves towards creating a 
culture of corporate accountability, post-transition. 
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
As Wettstein observes “business has never been and will never be an amoral or value neutral affair”.
388 
Therefore to assume that corporations are neutral and accordingly not accountable for moral issues, such as 
human rights, is myopic and imprudent.  Wettstein goes on to state that “human rights are the most 
promising starting point for elaborating on corporations‟ moral obligations and that the young and dynamic 
debate on business and human rights is leading the way to new approaches to theorizing and thinking about 
business.”
389 Therefore human rights, and correspondingly accountability for human rights violations, are 
important in terms of acknowledging the importance of corporations‟ moral obligations, aside from their 
economic purpose; and consequently it is important to reconceptualise our understanding of corporations as 
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morally benign. And a coherent way of making progress in this vein is by creating corporate accountability 
mechanisms. Nevertheless a cautious rather than precipitous approach must be adopted in relation to the 
realization of sound accountability mechanisms. 
In the final analysis corporations in general, and TNCs in particular, should be held accountable for 
complicity in state-sponsored human rights violations and there are at present some accountability 
mechanisms. But such mechanisms are not as effective as they could or should be, as they are not stringent 
enough, and often leave the monitoring and implementation of these mechanisms to the corporation to 
determine and implement. Moreover, there is no universal standard to which corporate actors must adhere, 
and without uniformity it is difficult to establish a firm global corporate accountability culture. It is, however, 
clear that the tide is beginning to turn and there is a gradual awakening to the importance of the corporate 
actor and the need to have effective accountability mechanisms, but these mechanisms still remain within 
the realm of soft law; no significant hard law mechanisms have been created. However what may be gleaned 
from this trend is that although international law is uniquely placed to create an accountability mechanism 
which transcends territorial bounds and jurisdictions, international law may not be the complete answer, as 
states can choose whether to sign and/or ratify such treaties or not (and corporate accountability is not as 
yet a part of customary international law). In addition domestic forums have even been used for the 
implementation of international law, such as through the use of the ATCA. Therefore domestic law, as may 
be seen from the South African example, also represents a relevant area requiring accountability 
mechanisms.  
Ultimately no one specific accountability mechanism represents a solution in itself, but such accountability 
mechanisms must and should rather work in conjunction. The use of international and domestic law, and 
voluntary corporate governance mechanisms are all important; the former to deal with past violations, and 
the latter to prescribe future behaviour. That being said, no easy answers are forthcoming; however, 
questions of accountability are becoming increasingly more pertinent as we shift from the post-Westphalian 
world to a globalized world with a multiplicity of important and powerful actors, aside from states and 
individuals. The form or type of accountability mechanisms aside, it is imperative that corporations be held 
accountable. Furthermore, complicity in human rights violations is an important issue and arguably augments 
and assists in the perpetuation and maintenance of such violations; therefore if any actor is involved (directly 
or indirectly) they should be held accountable. These are therefore important questions to answer, as 
political transitions of this nature, from authoritarian to democratic rule, are highly topical, as evidenced by 
recent uprisings sweeping parts of the Arabic-speaking world.390  
The aim of this dissertation was to evidence the accountability gap between corporations and other global 
actors (such as states and individuals); and the complexity of the business-human rights interplay in periods 
of political transition, in the hope that the current drive towards corporate accountability will not gradually 
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